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This thesis is a case study of the extent to which a series of factors influenced 
development of the U.S. Army Target Acquisition Designation System/Pilot Night Vision 
System (TADS/PNVS).  This study is one of a series being prepared under an ongoing 
research effort sponsored by Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command (AMC).  These 
studies will look at various weapon systems that participated in Operation Desert Storm 
(ODS) and will study the effectiveness of their Development Strategies, for the purpose 
of later comparing system effectiveness in ODS.  The TADS/PNVS was developed for 
the AH-64A Apache Helicopter, as a sighting system for the Hellfire missile system.  
This case study focuses on the system’s three critical technologies, evaluates their 
technical maturity at various stages versus Technology Readiness Levels, and analyzes 
how that affected the later development and testing.  The study also highlights funding 
stability, user involvement, integrated product teams, and testing strategies.  The thesis 
focuses particular attention on testing, and whether testing of the TADS/PNVS system 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the extent to which a series of factors 
influenced development of the Target Acquisition Designation System/Pilot Night Vision 
System (TADS/PNVS).  The research findings and conclusions will be primarily based 
upon answers to a questionnaire completed by the Government and Contractor Program 
Managers (PM) or Deputy Program Managers (DPM) and their staffs, supplemented by 
interviews with these individuals. 
 
 
Figure 1.   AH-64A Mission Equipment Package Architecture from TADS/PNVS Interfaces 
with other Mission Equipment of the AH-64 Helicopter, Martin Marietta Aerospace 





 B. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Army developed a variety of systems in the 1970s and 1980s, based on 
experience gained in the Viet Nam War.  Many of these systems did not see significant 
actual combat usage until 1991, during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. 
The first shots of Operation Desert Storm were fired by AH-64A Apache 
Helicopters (Task Force Normandy) on “January 17, 1991”.  The TADS/PNVS was used 
to acquire the targets.  At first, they used the heat from the target to guide the missiles.  
When a flash was distracting some missiles, they switched to optical guidance (From Hot 
Air to Hellfire - James W. Bradin, © 1994). 
The targets, two state-of-the-art Soviet-built radar sites, which threatened to give 
early warning of the initiation of the air campaign, were simultaneously attacked at 2:38 
am.  The targets were completely destroyed.  This allowed the allies to fly surreptitiously 
right in and bomb Iraq (Bradin, 1994). 
Originally, the Target Acquisition Designation System / Pilot Night Vision 
System (TADS/PNVS) was conceived by The U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM), 
which initially led the developmental effort.  It was subsequently transitioned to the 
Apache Attack Helicopter Program Manager’s Office (AAH PMO).  The U.S. Army 
developed TADS as a sensor for the Hellfire missile system.  TADS/PNVS was 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s under control of the TADS Program office, which was 
a part of the AAH Program Management Office. 
 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  Primary Question:  
What was the simulation and testing strategy for the system, and did that strategy 
adequately evaluate the system for its ultimate operational use? 
2. Secondary Questions: 
a. To what extent did the maturity (at project initiation) of the critical 
technologies being integrated into the TADS/PNVS system influence the development? 
2 
 b. How were the organizations that had developed these critical 
technologies involved during system development? 
c. To what extent was there user support and funding stability during 
system development? 
d. How effectively were (what we now call) integrated product teams 
employed during development? 
e. What was the key issue that the PM had to deal with during program 
development and how was it dealt with? 
 
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis will focus on TADS/PNVS development, will note how well it met its 
cost, schedule, and performance goals, and will also touch briefly upon its successful use 
in DESERT STORM.  It will consider the critical technologies of TADS / PNVS and 
whether they were effectively implemented in this system.  The research method will be a 
case study, developed by use of questionnaires and interviews. 
This thesis explores the interrelationship of players such as users, Government 
PMO, contractors, technology developers, and testers in carrying out the development, 
production, and fielding of the system.  In addition, factors such as the effective use of 
integrated product teams, the maturity and production readiness of the critical 
technologies, the role played by testing and simulation, the relationship between testing 
and operational use, and the key issue faced during the program and its resolution are 
examined.  Project outcomes, in cost, schedule and performance in terms of Desert 
Storm, are identified. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Research approach consists of determining three TADS/PNVS Critical 
Technologies in consultation with the TADS/PNVS technology community; sending 
questionnaires out to current and former Government and Contractor Program Managers 
and their staffs; then conducting interviews with them; and analyzing this data.  I used a 
tape-recorder attached to the telephone, when the interviewee consented to being 
3 
 recorded.  Additionally, I analyzed the testing of these systems to determine if it were 
adequate to prove the system's combat readiness.  The results of the initial interviews 
were written up and I determined where I had coverage or gaps in my data.  I then 
conducted follow-up interviews, or questioned alternate personnel, who filled in data 
gaps.  Next I used my overall understanding of the development to integrate the results 
from all survey questionnaires into one composite response survey result, to be used for 
the subsequent crosscutting analysis. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapters II through VI discuss the secondary research questions, and Chapter VII 
addresses the primary research question.  In each chapter, I summarize the data collected 
from the survey.  I will introduce the data, and also mention briefly the way in which it 
was acquired. 
I analyzed the data, comparing responses to various questions, and between the 
Government and contractor respondents, as well as advantages and disadvantages, 
analyzing them in terms of the primary and secondary questions.  Then I will discuss 
lessons learned, and draw conclusions and make recommendations. 
Chapter II: Mature Technologies: To what extent did the maturity (at project 
initiation) of the critical technologies being integrated into the TADS/PNVS system 
influence the development? 
Chapter III: Development Organizations: How were the organizations that had 
developed these critical technologies involved during system development? 
Chapter IV: User Support and Funding Stability: To what extent was there 
user support and funding stability during system development? 
Chapter V: Integrated Product Teams: How effectively were (what we now 
call) integrated product teams employed during development? 
Chapter VI: Key Program Manager Issue: What was the key issue that the PM 
had to deal with during program development and how was it dealt with? 
4 
 Chapter VII: Primary Question – Simulation and Testing Strategy: What was 
the simulation and testing strategy for the system, and did that strategy adequately 
evaluate the system for its ultimate operational use? 
In the back, there is a list of Acronyms and Definitions. 
In Appendix A, I will provide the Composite Questionnaire Response.  This will 
be a composite of the Government and developer / contractor responses. 
 
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This research will study the issues and relationships associated with the 
development of the TADS/PNVS.  This case study is one of a series being prepared under 
an ongoing research effort sponsored by Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command 
(AMC).  The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) has contracted with 
the University of Alabama in Huntsville to do this research, utilizing students.  After the 
Case Study research is completed, the Principal Investigators at UAH and Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) will do a crosscutting analysis to identify key factors 
common to all the systems studied that can be used to guide future decision-making.  The 
case studies will be made available to the Defense System Management College (DSMC) 
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 II. MATURE TECHNOLOGIES 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This chapter answers the research question, “To what extent did the maturity (at 
project initiation) of the critical technologies being integrated into the TADS/PNVS 
system influence the development?”  This chapter will look at the maturity of the critical 
technologies in terms of (1) project outcomes, (2) technology readiness, and (3) project 
timeline.  I will introduce the data, then analyze it, and finally draw conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Longbow Apache General Arrangement, from TM 1-1520-251-10, Technical 




 B. DATA 
Data was acquired using questionnaires / survey and interviews.  From all this 
data, a combined survey was created (see Appendix A.)  I extracted the data in this and 
subsequent chapters from the combined survey. 
In the survey, each question has a letter and number (i.e. T1) except for questions 
on page 1.  In the survey, the format is: question, then multiple-choice answers for some 
questions, and possibly a blank for answers.  When I extract information from the data, it 
will always reference this numbering system, and give the question and the answer that 
was chosen, not all possible choices (i.e. _X_4. All of the above.)  Responses to questions 
are in italics. 
To better understand this data, I include the critical technologies: 
T1. Now identify one or more (up to 3) technologies that were incorporated 
into the system you are studying.  These technologies should be among those central to 
the success of the system (critical). 
 
Technology A Line-of-Sight Stabilization 
Technology B FLIR target acquisition 
Technology C Laser to sensor bore sight 
Table 1.   Critical Technologies 
 
1. Outcomes? 





O1. Project Acceptance. Was the SYSTEM accepted to be put into Production?  
This is initial acceptance, not whether it actually ended up in production. 
 _X_3. Yes, the System was accepted for production 
O2. After the SYSTEM was accepted and was in Transition to Production, how 
many additional changes in the designs and processes were later required before the 
System was taken into full production?  _X_1. Many serious changes 
 There was a large amount of work.  TADS pointing angle accuracy was a 
big problem.  They had to work on getting a noise-free FLIR.  And they needed to work 
on consistency of Line-of-Sight (LOS) Stabilization – they made repeated changes to meet 
this specification requirement.  The delivery rate of 10, and then 12 per month 
exacerbated the problem. 
8 
 O3. Did the SYSTEM go into full production? 
 _X_3. Yes, the System was put into full production. 
O4. For each of the technologies A, B, and C above, to what extent was each used 
in the System as it was produced? 
Technology A B C 
4. Yes, the technology was used as planned. 4. X 4. X 4. X 
After the early stages of development, LOS stabilization never really became an 
issue any more.  FLIR acquisition ranges were met in the later stages of development and 
were not a problem in the production hardware.  Bore-sight performance continued to be 
an issue into the early stages of production.  The cost of the fixes were not major but took 
a lot of time to work out.  All three technologies were essential to the performance of the 
TADS and thus had to be successfully used in the final system. 
 
O5. After the SYSTEM reached Transition to Production, did the project go to 
Production as quickly as it should have?  _X_2. One to six months  
O6. After the SYSTEM was actually in Production, how many additional 
changes in designs and processes were required? _X_3. Minor changes     
“Again, the contractor was incentivised to make reliability improvement changes 
and under the warranty program could make changes to improve reliability and thereby 
save the contractor (and ultimately the Government) money.  Producibility changes were 
also made mostly because of parts that were no longer available.” 
O8.  Did the System Development program, as implemented, come in on budget? 
 _X_3. The project significantly exceeded budget. 
“As stated above there were significant overruns to the development contracts.  
The “Maturity phase contract with Martin Marietta started off at about $45M and ended 
up at about twice that.  However, TADS/PNVS was not a separate line item in the budget 
but was just part of the AH-64 budget and this overrun was covered within the AH-64 
budget.” 
O9. Did the System as it was implemented meet the project’s technical goals and 
functional requirements?  _X_1. The results met or exceeded technical goals. 
 
O9. (Note: there are two questions designated O9.)  Did the System have 
problems in the field under operational conditions in Desert Storm? 
 _X_3. No, the system was deployed and encountered no noticeable loss of 
effectiveness. 
 
2. Technology Readiness? 
















T5. When System planning and pre-
development began, technology TRL was: 
4 4 3 
T6. When System went into Development, 
technology TRL was: 
5 5 4 
T7. When System reached Transition to 
Production, technology TRL was: 
9 9 8 
Table 2.   Data for Questions T5, T6, and T7 
TRL = Technology Readiness Level (TRL numbers are defined at the end of 
Appendix A, Combined Survey) 
When SP (System Planning phase) started, stabilization technology was not new 
and had had many applications, but none to this difficult an application in a helicopter 
flight environment.  Likewise, due to the work on FLIR technology by NVL [U.S. Army 
Night Vision Labs] there was a significant technology base to draw on; however, meeting 
target detection and recognition requirements was a very difficult goal and integration of 
a FLIR meeting these requirements into the stabilized turret was a real challenge.  The 
bore-sight problem was recognized as critical from the very beginning, but achieving a 
bore-sight, which met accuracy requirements and remained stable over environmental 
extremes proved very difficult and tenuous.  Since bore-sight stability is impacted by 
many factors in all sensors, bore-sighting components and the stabilized turret, it was not 
possible to address bore-sight shortcomings until the entire TADS system was designed, 
built, and tested for other areas of performance. 
 
SP. In what organization was the primary work leading up to this point 
accomplished?  There were really three important organizations that contributed.  The 
ASH PM (Advanced Scout Helicopter) prior to being cancelled and the AAH PM were 
the driving force for establishing and planning the program.  The technology work was 
being led by the MICOM G&C (Guidance and Control) lab and The Night Vision Lab 
(NVL).  Contractor S&T (Science and Technology) organizations were doing their own 
work in response to the anticipated requirement for the ASH and AAH programs. 
 
“The MICOM G&C lab was the developer of the Hellfire missile (concept) for 
which the TADS acquires and designates targets.  Major systems requirements such as 
Total Pointing Error (TPE) for the laser designator were defined by the G&C lab based 
on testing and simulations.  They also did early work on the laser hardware that does the 
designation.  NVL was the developer of FLIR technology, which was used in the TADS 
night sight and the PNVS.  They were responsible for the development and eventually 
production of the FLIR common modules, which are used in the TADS Night Sight.  
Significant support was given by these labs and Frankfort Arsenal (fire control, optics) in 
formulating requirements, evaluating proposals, and monitoring development progress.” 
 
D. What was the Technology Readiness Level (refer to page 8) for the SYSTEM 
on this date?  Level 3: The system met the spec, but not consistently.  They had proved 
10 
 that the gimbals would meet the LOS (Line-of-Sight) Stabilization.  A prototype was built 
in the proposal phase. 
What was the nature of the Army Lab/Center’s involvement? (Engineering 
support?  Simulation or testing?  Integration?  Requirements interpretation?)  G&C Lab, 
NVL, and Frankfort Arsenal provided engineering support, simulation, and requirements 
interpretation. 
TP (Transition to Production). In what organization was the primary work in the 
period from D to TP accomplished?  Martin Marietta, Orlando, the Prime Contractor.  
This work was done under a project management (PM) organization. 
What was the nature of the Army Lab/Center’s involvement? (Engineering 
support?  Simulation or testing?  Integration?  Requirements interpretation?)  MICOM 
G&C, NVL, and Frankfort Arsenal continued to provide engineering support, simulation, 
test witnessing, and requirements interpretation. 
 
3. Timeline? 
This covers survey questions on Page 1.  The timeline data from page 1 is as 
follows: 
SP. What was the approximate starting date of systems planning and pre-
development work?  This date is when planning work began on the integrated system. 
The systems concept and applications had been formulated, but applications were still 
speculative.  There was no proof or detailed analysis to support the approach.  SYSTEMS 
PLANNING START DATE (SP):  _____/1976  (mo/yr)  [TRL2 at system level] 
D. Date when Development started. Typically at this date, funding started for 
system advanced or engineering development, a Government project office was formed 
and Prime Contractor(s) selected. DEVELOPMENT START DATE (D):  _____/1977  
(mo/yr) 
TP. Date of achieving “Transition to Production” when producible system 
prototype has been demonstrated in an operational environment.  Prototype is near 
or at planned operational system, produced on small scale.  TRANSITION TO 
PRODUCTION (TP) DATE: _____/1980 (mo/yr) (TRL7 at system level) 
 




10 Dec 1976:  Down select to Hughes YAH-64A 
FY 1982:   Congress approves LRIP, $444.5 M Contract for 11 aircraft 
Table 3.   From Hot Air to Hellfire Timeline 
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 Further timeline data was found in “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), 30 




22 June 1973 Competitive Phase I, Development Contracts awarded to Hughes 
Helicopters and Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc 
7 Dec 1976 DSARC approved AAH entry into full scale development (Phase II) and 
Secretary of the Army selected Hughes Helicopters, Model YAH-64 
10 Mar 1977 TADS/PNVS directed for development, contracts awarded to Martin 
Marietta and Northrop Corporation. 
30 Jan 1981 Army awarded Long Lead Time contract to MMOA (TADS/PNVS) 
20 Feb 1981 Army LLTI contract to Hughes (AH-64) 
Jun-Aug 
1981 
Operational Test (OT II) was completed on time at Ft. Hunter-Ligett  
18 Nov 1981 Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) III was completed 
26 Mar 1982 DSARC III held, initial production of Apaches approved 
April 1982 Production contracts awarded to Hughes, MMOA, and General Electric 
(engines) 
Early 1984 McDonnell Douglas acquired Hughes Helicopter  
26 Jan 1984 McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (MDHC) first production 
aircraft (PV01) rolled out 
22 July 1986 Initial Operational Capability 
Table 4.   Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Timeline 
 
Test Plan for TADS/PNVS Competitive Development 
1 Dec 1979 
to 
 29 Feb 1980 
The TADS/PNVS competitive development test was conducted at Yuma 
Proving Grounds (YPG). It was a fly-off between the Martin Marietta 
Corporation and Northrop Corporation TADS/PNVS advanced 
prototypes, each mounted on AH-64 aircraft. 
Table 5.   TADS/PNVS Competitive Development Timeline 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the maturity of the critical technologies in terms of (1) 




 1. Outcomes? 
The three critical technologies of the TADS/PNVS are: Laser to sensor bore-sight 
(LSBS), Line-of-Sight Stabilization (LOSS), and Forward-looking Infra Red (FLIR) 
Target Acquisition (FTA).  The critical technologies were used as originally planned.  All 
three of the technologies were essential; TADS would not have worked without them.  
LOS Stabilization was fixed in early development, FTA in later development.  Bore 
sighting wasn’t finalized until early production – a lot of time was needed, but not all that 
much money.  Although the technologies were immature at the beginning of 
development, the developer persevered and the system was eventually accepted for full 
production. 
Developing a system such as TADS/PNVS is a tremendous amount of work.  This 
work paid off and the system was very mature when it transitioned to production.  A lot 
of work had to be done to both get ready for production, and in the transition to 
production and the early stages of production.  Changes included work on pointing angle 
accuracy, noise-free FLIR, and consistency of Line-of-Sight (LOS) Stabilization, which 
required repeated changes.  The required delivery rates of 10, and then 12 per month, 
ramping up from 1 per month, increased the level of difficulty. 
In going to production, the system only experienced a short delay of one to six 
months.  There were some minor changes during TP, in order for the system to meet or 
improve performance.  Similarly, there were some minor changes to the system while in 
production, mostly to increase system reliability.  The contractor had a financial incentive 
to improve reliability (which eventually saves the Government money also.)  They also 
made producibility changes due to parts becoming obsolete. 
There was a significant increase in development costs.  The original TADS/PNVS 
contract was for $45 million, and it ended up costing twice that amount.  However, the 
system met or exceeded technical performance goals.  The system was deployed on the 




 2. Technology Readiness? 
When system planning and pre-development began, two of the three critical 
technologies (Line-of-Sight Stabilization and FLIR target acquisition) had been verified 
in breadboard form in a laboratory environment (Technology Readiness Level 4).  LOSS 
had never been tried on a helicopter – a high-vibration environment.  The third 
technology (Laser to sensor bore-sight (LSBS)) had only been verified by a combination 
of laboratory work and analytical studies (TRL 3).  Three groups did most of the 
technical work: the MICOM Guidance and Control (G&C) lab, the US Army Night 
Vision Lab (NVL), and contractor science and technology group.  Additionally, Frankfort 
Arsenal gave support in fire control and optics. 
By the time the system was in development, Laser to sensor bore-sight had been 
verified completely in a laboratory environment, and the other two technologies had been 
verified in a realistic, though simulated environment (TRL 5).  This TRL indicates the 
technologies were advanced enough for the development phase to start, but not yet ready 
for fielding.  They had built a prototype, and the system met the specification, though not 
consistently.  The U.S. Army’s contribution came from the G&C Lab, NVL, and 
Frankfort Arsenal, which provided engineering support, simulation, and requirements 
interpretation. 
When the system reached the transition to production, the technologies were 
considerably more advanced.  An actual system had been tested, and the Laser to sensor 
bore-sight had been qualified in test and demonstration.  The technology was proven in 
its final form.  The other two technologies, in final form, had also been successfully 
tested in a realistic operational environment.  At this point the system was given the go-
ahead for production. 
There were still some production reliability and manufacturability issues to work 
out, but the essential system was ready.  Bore-sight stability is affected by a number of 
characteristics of all sensors, bore-sighting components, and the stabilized turret.  This 
makes doing the bore-sight design difficult until after the rest of the TADS system has 
been designed, built and tested.  During this phase, Martin Marietta did the primary work.  




The following table is a timeline of the TADS/PNVS Program from Systems 
Planning (SP), though Development (D), to the Transition to Production (TP).  As you 
can see from the table, the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the three critical 
technologies gradually increased as the program progressed.  [See definitions of TRL at 
end of Appendix A, Combined Survey.] 
Key Program Start Dates Year Technology 
A &B TRL 
Technology 
C TRL 
Systems Planning (SP) 1976 4 3 
Development Start (D) 1977 5 4 
Transition to Production (TP) 1980 9 8 
Table 6.   Program Timeline 
 
The following timeline is compiled by merging these dates in with data from 
other TADS documents (From Hot Air to Hellfire, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), 













 Date Event Ref. 
22 June 1973 Competitive Phase I, Development Contracts awarded to Hughes 
Helicopters and Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc 
SAR 
1976 Systems Planning (SP) Survey
7 Dec 1976 DSARC approved AAH entry into full scale development (Phase II) 
and Secretary of the Army selected Hughes Helicopters, Model 
YAH-64 
SAR 
10 Dec 1976:  Down select to Hughes YAH-64A Bradin 
10 Mar 1977 TADS/PNVS directed for development, contracts awarded to Martin 
Marietta and Northrop Corporation. 
SAR 
1977 Development Start (D) Survey
1 Dec 1979 
to 
29 Feb 1980 
The TADS/PNVS competitive development test was conducted at 
Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG). It was a fly-off between the Martin 
Marietta Corporation and Northrop Corporation TADS/PNVS 




1980 Transition to Production (TP) Survey
30 Jan 1981 Army awarded Long Lead Time contract to MMOA (TADS/PNVS) SAR 
20 Feb 1981 Army LLTI contract to Hughes (AH-64) SAR 
Jun-Aug 
1981 
Operational Test (OT II) was completed on time at Ft. Hunter-Ligett SAR 
18 Nov 1981 Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) III was 
completed 
SAR 
FY 1982 Congress approves LRIP, $444.5 M Contract for 11 aircraft Bradin 
26 Mar 1982 DSARC III held, initial production of Apaches approved SAR 
April 1982 Production contracts awarded to Hughes, MMOA, and General 
Electric (engines) 
SAR 
Early 1984 McDonnell Douglas acquired Hughes Helicopter  SAR 
26 Jan 1984 McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (MDHC) first production 
aircraft (PV01) rolled out 
SAR 
22 July 1986 Initial Operational Capability SAR 
Table 7.   Overall Program Timeline 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This section will draw conclusions concerning the maturity of the critical 
technologies.  Conclusions concerning the timeline will be interspersed with other 
sections. 
 
1.  Outcomes? 
The critical technologies were all essential to the TADS/PNVS program: Laser to 
sensor bore-sight (LSBS), Line-of-Sight Stabilization (LOSS), and Forward-looking Infra 
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 Red (FLIR) Target Acquisition (FTA).  The TADS/PNVS was significantly beyond 
existing technology, and there was a good deal or risk to overcome.  The amount of work 
required was greater than planned, but the developer and the PMO were able to complete 
the development and deliver a functioning system. 
This additional work effort carried over into the transition to production, and in 
early production, but the reward was that they were at a fairly good level of readiness.  
Operational Testing was completed on time at Fort Hunter-Ligett in June-August 1981.  
Changes to the system were critical, to meet or improve performance, to increase system 
reliability and to improve reliability, but did not delay system production very much.  The 
TADS/PNVS contract cost twice the amount originally contracted, from $45 million to 
about $90 million; but the system met its technical objectives and performed well in 
Operation Desert Storm. 
 
2.  Technology Readiness? 
At the start of system planning (1976) and pre-development, the TADS/PNVS 
critical technologies were verified at Technology Readiness Levels 3 or 4 (in a lab 
environment or by analytical studies.)  By the time the system was in development 
(1977), this had advanced to TRL4 or TRL5 (verified in realistic, though simulated 
environment.)  When the system reached the transition to production (1980), the critical 
technologies were at TRL8 (qualified in test and demonstration) or TRL9 (an actual 
system had been tested.) 
The TADS/PNVS transition to production phase was successful because the 
system was at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level for the transition.  A lot of 
work was needed to meet remaining performance requirements and on manufacturability 
and reliability, but most requirements already had been met at this point.  The developer 





 E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1.  Technology Maturation: 
Study the various processes of technology maturation, including technology 
developed for civilian industry, Research Development partnering development efforts by 
Defense contractors, and technology developed specifically for a program.  Study the 
technical and financial processes, and the risk to overall project funding. 
 
2. Technology Readiness: 
Study technology readiness at the beginning, during, and after each of the major 
wars of this century (World War I, World War II, Korean War, and the Viet Nam War) 
and compare these readiness levels to those of Operation Desert Storm and the war in 
Afghanistan. 
 
3. Technology Readiness Level Measurement: 
Study various methods used to measure technology readiness level, by whatever 
names they are known, and how well each technique works to give the program manager 




 III. DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This chapter answers the secondary research question, “How were the 
organizations that had developed these critical technologies involved during system 
development?”  This chapter will look at the involvement of the organizations that had 
developed the critical technologies during system development, in terms of (1) the role of 
S&T organization that developed technology, (2) role of Government S&T organization, 
(3) difficulties in integrating technology, (4) production readiness, (5) importance of 
technology to Prime Contractor, (6) familiarity of Prime with technology, and (7) timely 
problem disclosure.  I will list the data, then analyze it, and finally draw conclusions. 
 
Figure 3.   General Arrangement page 2, fromTM 1-1520-251-10, Operator’s Manual for 





1. Role of S&T Organization that Developed Technology? 
This covers survey questions T8, T9, T10, and Page 1.  Page 1 data is listed in 
Chapter II. 
T8. For each of the technologies A, B & C, 
did an Army Laboratory or Center make a 
significant contribution to achieving any of 







T8.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness at 
start of Planning/Pre-development.  X  
T9.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness for 
Development. X X X 
T10. Yes, it contributed to Readiness for 
Transition to Production. X X X 
Table 8.   Data for Questions T8, T9, and T10 
 
2. Role of Government S&T Organization? 
This covers survey questions T8 through T10, B11, and Page 1.  Page 1 data is 
listed in Chapter II; and T8 through T10 are listed above in ‘2. Role of S&T organization 
that developed technology?’ 
 
B11. Army Labs/Centers resisted project ideas or approaches.  _X_ (No) 
 
3. Difficulties in Integrating Technology? 
This covers survey questions T3, H3, B1, and B4 through B8.   
 
T3.  Production Impact: What was the impact of the technology on then 
existing production processes? 
 (Answer for date you provided for Development start, D.) 
Technology A B C 
1. Technology forced deep and serious production process change? X X  
2. Technology caused significant production process change?   X 
Table 9.   Data for Question T3 
 
This level was chosen because the contractor was not producing other systems 
like this at the time.  At the component level, production processes were not significantly 
different and did not require much change; however, and the system and major 
subsystem-level (FLIR, Day Sight, bore-sight) production acceptance test stations had to 
be created to insure that delivered hardware was meeting system-level specifications.  
Also, an effort was made to identify component tests and processes, which would reduce 
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 the failures that would be seen at system-level and major subsystem-level acceptance 
tests.  These component tests were unique and different some of the times because they 
were driven by system-level specifications, which were unique at this time to the 
TADS/PNVS. 
 
H3. Key Skills.   This question asks about “key skills” essential to the success of 
the project, defined as skills “that if they were not available at all, would have stopped 
team progress at the point when they were needed.” 
Were there any key skills not adequately represented on the team?  _X_ No. 
The design chief could draft people from other groups.  It was as good as “DX 
brick bat” priority, which same individual had later on, at least within the company in 
Orlando.  However, they didn’t have the microwave electronics hybrids design group, 
nor the printed circuit layout design people on the project.  Those were both functional 
groups, and the TADS/PNVS group didn’t have enough work to justify keeping them on 
their team.  But they had as good of a priority with these groups as any other project in 
the company in Orlando. 
 
B1.  It was harder than expected to take the risk out of the new technology.  
Major effort 
B4.  A critical production issue was uncovered very late in the process.  Minor 
effort 
B5.  Management pressure pushed technology prematurely into production.  
Minor effort 
B6. There was a lack of acceptance standards for the new technology.  Very minor 
effort 
B7. The technology was hard to scale up from lab & pilot tests.  Significant effort 
B8. Testing, quality control and/or acceptance took longer than planned.  
Significant effort 
 
4. Production Readiness? 
This covers survey questions Page 1, T3, H6, B4, B5, B6, and B8.  Page 1 data is 
listed in Chapter II; T3, B4, B5, B6, and B8 are listed above in ‘4. Difficulties in 
integrating technology?’ 
H6. Whose facilities were going to be the primary production site for the 
application of the new technologies?    _X_ 1. Prime contractor’s facilities  ___2. Both 
Prime and supplier facilities ___3. Supplier facilities 
 
5. Importance of Technology to Prime? 




 Check (√) the best answer for each 
technology. 




T4. Looking back at the Development start date, at that time how important were these 
technologies to the Prime? 
Prime was planning or had started 
follow-on uses of the technology.   
2.  X 2.  X 2.  X 
Table 10.   Data for Question T4 
 
6. Familiarity of Prime with Technology? 
This covers survey questions Page 1, T2, and T3.  Page 1 data is listed in Chapter 
II; and T3 is listed above in ‘4. Difficulties in integrating technology?’ 
T2. How new was each technology to the Prime Contractor?  For each 
technology A, B, and C, was the technology: 
Technology A B C 
1. New and unproven for the Prime Contractor? X  X 
2. Technology had been used by Prime Contractor, but it was 
new to this kind of application?
 X  
Table 11.   Data for Question T2 
 
7. Timely Problem Disclosure? 
This covers survey questions D12, D16, and D19.  
D12. The team was reluctant to share concerns with Government PM.  1 _X_ 
(Strongly disagree) 
D16. Usually team knew right away where to get necessary outside help. 4 _X_ 
(Agree somewhat) 
D19. The Government PM was reluctant to share problems with Army leaders.  1 
_X_ (Strongly disagree) 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the involvement of the organizations that had developed 
the critical technologies during system development in terms of (1) role of S&T 
organization that developed technology, (2) role of Government S&T organization, (3) 
difficulties in integrating technology, (4) production readiness, (5) importance of 





 1. Role of S&T Organization that Developed Technology? 
The U.S. Army Night Vision Labs (NVL) was the original developer of the FLIR 
technology used in the TADS night sight and the PNVS.  They provided support to the 
TADS/PNVS program from the very start of the System Planning phase, and they 
continued to provide support through development and the Transition to Production 
phase. 
The MICOM Guidance and Control (G&C) Lab was involved in system 
requirements for Total Pointing Error (TPE) for the laser designator, which is a 
component of laser to sensor bore-sight.  G&C labs did a lot of testing and simulation 
work to develop these requirements and early work on the laser hardware. 
Martin Marietta Corporation Science and Technology organizations were doing 
their own work in response to the anticipated requirement for the ASH and AAH 
programs.  They needed to develop the technology and to create a manufacturing plan. 
 
2. Role of Government S&T Organization? 
In addition to the involvement listed above, Frankfort Arsenal, as well as U.S. 
Army Night Vision Labs (NVL) and MICOM Guidance and Control (G&C) Lab, gave 
significant support in fire control and optics in developing requirements, evaluating 
proposals and monitoring development progress.  These labs were quite open to 
requirements changes and other project ideas. 
Army labs contributed to readiness at the start of the planning phase for FLIR 
target acquisition.  They continued to provide readiness support for the three critical 
technologies throughout development and the transition to production phases. 
 
3. Difficulties in Integrating Technology? 
The contractor had to make serious changes in their production process for two of 
the three most critical technologies (LOSS and FLIR Target Acquisition) and significant 
changes for the third (Laser to sensor bore-sight).  The contractor, Martin-Marietta, was 
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 not then producing similar systems.  Components were similar, but new types of system 
tests had to be developed in order to guarantee meeting system specifications. 
Using a novel testing philosophy to find system faults earlier, some requirements 
were flowed down to lower level modules and components to eliminate failures earlier in 
the process.  These tests were often unique because they were driven by system-level 
requirements. 
The TADS / PNVS was a critical contract for Martin-Marietta, and the upper 
management put a high priority on it.  They provided personnel in adequate numbers with 
the skills needed for the project.  Some specialties were from functional groups that gave 
the TADS/PNVS group a high priority, but didn’t transfer personnel – because their full 
time services were not necessary. 
Various risk factors caused the program major difficulties.  For example, taking 
the risk out of the new technologies was a major effort.  Also, significant effort was 
needed both to scale the technology up from lab and pilot tests and to run tests 
successfully.  However, only minor effort was needed to deal with critical production 
issues, with management pressure pushing technology too quickly into production, and 
with the lack of acceptance standards for the new technologies. 
 
4. Production Readiness? 
Because the Prime Contractor’s facility was the planned production site, there was 
no need to transfer the technology to a new facility, with the consequent learning curve.  
A sizable portion of the development was done by the Prime Contractor, so they already 
had a lot of experience with these technologies. 
The TADS/PNVS was ready for production.  Some of the risk factors (listed in 
paragraph 4 above) such as scaling technology and running tests successfully, slowed the 
program down and took considerable effort to overcome.  However, other factors 
required only minor effort. 
The three critical technologies forced significant or even serious production 
process changes, however these changes were not all unexpected since the developer was 
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 also the production company.  Some of these changes did cause some delay (about 6 
months) in production.  Components were similar to other production systems, but the 
system was not.  The system-level tests forced them to try to reduce failures by instituting 
unusual component tests to catch system failures earlier. 
 
5. Importance of Technology to Prime? 
At the time of the start of Development, the Prime was planning or had actually 
started follow-on uses of all three critical technologies: Line-of-Sight Stabilization 
(LOSS), FLIR target acquisition (FTA), and Laser to sensor bore-sight (LSBS).  Martin 
Marietta did have some follow-on contracts that made use of this technology (e.g. U.S. 
Air Force LANTIRN).  Many problems had to be overcome to get the TADS / PNVS 
operational; but the knowledge gained helped the Prime establish itself in this technology 
and gain a foothold in a profitable market. 
 
6. Familiarity of Prime with Technology? 
The Laser to sensor bore-sight and Line-of-Sight (LOS) Stabilization were new 
and unproven technologies for the Prime Contractor, Martin Marietta.  They had used 
FLIR target acquisition, but they were new to this kind of application.  The contractor 
struggled quite a bit in getting this technology working. 
Technology forced deep and serious production process changes for both 
stabilization and bore sighting.  FLIR target acquisition required significant production 
process changes.  Production acceptance test stations for these technologies were created 
to test hardware to the system-level specifications.  They tried to identify component tests 
and processes that would catch both system-level failures and major subsystem failures.  






 7. Timely Problem Disclosure? 
When there were problems, usually the development team knew immediately 
where to get outside help.  The development team was open about sharing concerns with 
the Government PM, and the PM shared problems with Army leaders.  This open 
communications helped the Government stay informed and fix problems before they 
became too big.  Any problems the team couldn’t handle directly, or with help they could 
get, the Army was in a position to know about the problem and take steps to resolve it. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This section draws conclusions concerning the involvement of the organizations 
that had developed these critical technologies during system development.  
 
1. Role of S&T Organization that Developed Technology? 
The U.S. Army Night Vision Labs (NVL), the MICOM Guidance and Control 
(G&C) Lab, and Martin Marietta Corporation Science and Technology organizations, all 
of which developed important TADS/PNVS technology, were actively supporting the 
program with reviews and additional lab work. 
 
2. Role of Government S&T Organization? 
Additionally, Frankfort Arsenal gave further technical support.  These labs gave 
assistance in the areas of requirements changes and they were open to other project ideas 
throughout the development and transition to production phases. 
 
3. Difficulties in Integrating Technology? 
Martin Marietta made significant changes to accommodate production of 
TADS/PNVS, in their process and in new, more stringent component tests.  TADS/PNVS 
was able to get most of the personnel they needed permanently on their team, and high 
priority for some functional specialties that were needed for only part of the time. 
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 Major effort was needed to take the risk out of the new technologies, although the 
project team was eventually successful; and significant effort was needed both to scale 
the technology up from lab and pilot tests and to run tests successfully.  However, only 
minor effort was needed to deal with other development and production problems. 
 
4. Production Readiness? 
The Prime Contractor was ready for production, since they also participated in 
development.  Some technological risk factors took some time and effort to overcome, 
but nothing out of the ordinary.  There were production process changes required by the 
three critical technologies, but delays were minimal – about six months.  System-level 
testing also caused some additional production readiness problems. 
 
5. Importance of Technology to Prime? 
The critical technologies in the system were of great value to the developer, both 
for TADS/PNVS contracts, and for other follow-on contracts.  The problems that the 
Prime overcame established it in a profitable market. 
 
6. Familiarity of Prime with Technology? 
The critical technologies of the TADS/PNVS system were mostly new to the 
developer at the start of the program, causing some struggle to master these technologies.  
FLIR target acquisition had been used before, but in a dissimilar application.  This high 
technology also forced production changes to their factory.  In addition, Martin-Marietta 
adopted new subsystem and component testing to ferret out system-level problems. 
 
7. Timely Problem Disclosure? 
Problems were freely reported from developer to Government PM, and from PM 
to Army leaders.  This open communications helped the Government stay informed and 
fix problems before they became too big.  If a problem occurred which was outside team 
members’ capabilities, the team was always able to get outside help. 
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Development Organizations: In summary, both Government agencies and the 
developer contributed greatly to the success of the TADS / PNVS program.  Significant 
effort was needed to develop the system, in some cases major effort.  Significant effort 
also was needed for production readiness.  But the new technology field of TADS/PNVS 
was a strong motivator to Martin Marietta.  The critical technologies were mostly new to 
the developer, but their effort paid off.  And any problems they encountered were freely 
reported by the developer to the PMO, and by the PMO to Army higher headquarters, 
which allowed additional resources to be used to head off some potential problems. 
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Market Share Over Time: 
Examine the market share that Martin-Marietta Corporation, now Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, enjoyed with the three critical technologies over time. 
 
2. Technology Buy-In: 
Examine how some companies buy into certain technologies, by buying a 
company in the field or by bidding below cost on a contract, and whether the venture was 
financially successful for the company in the long run.  Also, examine the effect on their 
customer(s) of using 'novices' in this technical area. 
 
3. Science and Technology Role: 
Examine scientific groups in various companies, and how they contribute to 
developing financially successful products. 
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 IV. USER SUPPORT AND FUNDING STABILITY 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This chapter answers the research question, “To what extent was there user 
support and funding stability during system development?”  This chapter will cover the 
extent of user support and funding stability during system development in terms of (1) 
user support (or role of user), (2) requirements stability, and (3) funding stability.  I will 
introduce the data, then analyze it, and finally draw conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 4.   TADS Sighting System Image, from TM 1-1520-251-10, Operator’s Manual for 
Helicopter, Attack, AH-64D Longbow Apache, 15 Dec 1998 
 
B. DATA  
 
1. User Support? (Or Role of User?) 
This covers survey questions D18, F5, F6, W3, W4, and W5. 
 
D18. There was a lot of contact with TRADOC* during the project.  Strongly Agree 
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 *By TRADOC here and elsewhere, we mean Training & Doctrine Command and/or other 
appropriate user representatives. 
 
How often did the following occur during Development? 













F5. Did TRADOC/other user organizations show strong support?  Many Times 
 
F6. Were there changes in key TRADOC or other user personnel?  Once or Twice 
 
Please check (9) all stages when the activity occurred. 
SP D TP  
Selection Development Transition  
 
 Early Middle Later  (Never) (DK/
N/A) 
W3. When was the TRADOC 
consulted on project questions? 
X X X X X   
W4. When was there change in 
key TRADOC / user 
representatives? 
      X 
W5. When did TRADOC / other 
users show strong support? 
X X X X X   
W6. When was there change in 
the system requirements? 
     X  
Table 12.   Data for Questions W3, W4, W5, and W7 
“The TRADOC Systems Manager and other military personnel changed about 
every three years...  However, I don’t think this was ever a problem. ” 
 
2. Requirements Stability? 
This covers survey questions F7, W6, and B13.  W6 is listed above with W3, W4, 
and W5 for legibility. 
 
How often did the following occur during Development? 
F7. Were there changes in system requirements (e.g., threat)?  Never 
 
Did this problem come up during this project? 
B13. Threat definition or other requirements changed during the project.  _X_ No 
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 3. Funding Stability? 
This covers survey questions H1, D11, and B2. 
H1.  At some point, was the project either (slowed down or stopped and 
restarted)? _X_3. Neither 
The TADS/PNVS program was originally part of the ASH (Advanced Scout 
Helicopter) program, which was cancelled.  This happened prior to 1977, the start of SP 
phase.  AAH (Apache AH 64 PMO) was already involved when ASH left the program, as 
was MICOM.  AAH and MICOM support of TADS/PNVS continued on, after ASH left the 
program. 
D11.  There was often uncertainty about the future of project funding.  Strongly 
agree 




This section analyzes the data, comparing the two individual responses, as well as 
advantages and disadvantages, analyzing them in terms of the primary and secondary 
questions.  This section will analyze the extent there was user support and funding 
stability during system development in terms of (1) User support? (Or role of user?), (2) 
Requirements stability, and (3) Funding stability. 
 
1. User Support? (Or Role of User?) 
The TADS/PNVS Program Office had a lot of contact with the Training & 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) during development.  TRADOC is the primary interface 
to the users.  TRADOC frequently showed strong support of the project.  Occasionally, 
there were changes in key TRADOC personnel, approximately every three years, but this 
never affected the program much. 
TRADOC was consulted on project questions throughout the program, from 
earliest systems planning, through development, and into the transition to production.  
And TRADOC responded by showing strong support for the TADS/PNVS program 




 2. Requirements Stability? 
The system-level requirements were very stable during development.  The threat 
definitions (detail requirements) that the TADS/PNVS was required to counter were 
stable, as well.  Requirements changes in the development period can radically change 
the design.  Sometimes the contractor has to get extra money or time to effect these 
changes. 
 
3. Funding Stability? 
Project funding was frequently uncertain.  The project required almost twice the 
contracted amount, and the extra money had to be provided by the AAH Program 
Manager. 
The project usually had all the resources needed for development.  Occasionally, 
some minor effort was needed to make changes or compromises because of resource 
shortages. 
Although the Advanced Scout Helicopter (ASH) program, which was leading the 
TADS /PNVS program, was cancelled, the AAH (Apache AH-64 PMO) was already 
involved as was MICOM.  There was really no affect on the program, other than a change 
in leadership.  Also, instead of needing to meet the demands of two PMOs, the developer 
now only had to satisfy one, which lowered the technical risk. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS ON USER SUPPORT AND FUNDING STABILITY 
This section will draw conclusions concerning the extent there was user support 
and funding stability during system development. 
 
1. User Support? (Or Role of User?) 
The Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provided strong support to the 
TADS/PNVS Program Office during development.  TRADOC was consulted on the 
program, and provided worthy user representation. 
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2. Requirements Stability? 
TADS/PNVS program had good requirements stability at the system level and 
stable threat definitions. 
 
3. Funding Stability? 
Funding was quite unstable on the TADS/PNVS program.  However, they usually 
had most of the resources they needed when funding was stable.  Although the Advanced 
Scout Helicopter (ASH) program was cancelled, this affected neither program funding, 
nor program continuity. 
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Funding Stability and Program Effectiveness: 
Study various programs with good and poor funding histories, and how the 
program has been effective in developing a useful product. 
 
2. Requirements Stability and Program Effectiveness: 
Study various programs with good and poor requirements stability, and how the 
program has been effective in developing a useful product. 
 
3. User Support and Program Effectiveness: 
Study various programs with good and poor user support, and how the program 
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 V. INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This chapter answers the research question, “How effectively were (what we now 
call) integrated product teams (IPT) employed during development?”  This chapter will 
look at the effectiveness of IPTs in terms of (1) IPT approach used, (2) Proper staffing of 
IPT, (3) Design to manufacturing linkage, and (4) Design to supplier linkage.  I will 
introduce the data, then analyze it, and finally draw conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 5.   TADS / PNVS Sight Subsystem, from TM 1-1520-251-10, Operator’s Manual for 





 B. DATA 
1. IPT Approach Used? 
This covers survey questions H2, H4, H5, D1, D7, D9, D13, D14, D16, D19, and 
F4. 
 
H2.  Was the project set up as a cross-functional integrated product team (IPT), a 
project team drawn from different parts of the contractor’s organization with most of the 
skills needed for the development?  Yes. 
 If YES, was it: _X_1. Set up by management, with different functions & 
departments tasked to provide team members. 
 
In the interview, the government respondent goes on to explain that they did not 
call them IPTs then, but they were essentially the same thing. 
“This concept of an integrated product team (IPT), really came more into vogue 
about or after the time we first went into production.  At that time there was a big 
emphasis to bring in production people, logistics, and so forth in the very early stages of 
the design program.  In the early stages of the TADS PNVS program, we did have those 
people involved. 
We did not call it IPT and they didn’t organize it that much, but there were 
reliability, logistics, maintenance, and production requirements.  In the beginning of the 
program in 1977, when they did this initial primary design with seven different 
contractors and then the fly-off, there was much heavier emphasis … on the performance 
aspects of TADS/PNVS, because it is something that no one had ever done before, so the 
rest of (the program) doesn't matter if you cannot do the performance part.” 
 
H4. During the Development stage of the project, how many people on the 
team were collocated very close together? (On the same floor of a building within a one-
minute walk.)   _X_2. Most (2/3rds or more) 
 H4a. Including the above, how many people on the team were collocated 
in the same building?  X 2. Most (2/3rds or more) 
Most were in the same building, about 90%, and the rest were in another building 
in the same city. 
H5. How many people on the team involved in the Development stage had 
worked before with others on the project? _X_2. Most (2/3rds or more)  
 
Team Participants & Communications during Development (D1-D19) 
Here are some statements about the people on the project during the System 
Development stage.  Please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or 
disagreement that each statement is a description of team processes on this project. 
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 D1.  The team leader was good at resolving technical disagreements.  Strongly 
Agree  
D7. Team meetings were sometimes frustrating and non-productive.  Neither 
agree nor disagree 
D9. Project results did not take advantage of the team’s best ideas.  Disagree 
somewhat 
D13. Management project reviews were constructive & helpful.  Agree somewhat 
D14. Formal reviews were conducted at key decision points. Strongly Agree 
D16. Usually team knew right away where to get necessary outside help. Agree 
somewhat 
D19. The Government PM was reluctant to share problems with Army leaders.  
Strongly Disagree 
 
How often did team members do the following during Development? 
F4. Needed management help to resolve project team disagreements?  _X_ (Once 
or Twice) 
 
2. Proper Staffing of IPT? 
This covers survey questions H3, D3 through D6, D8, and D10.  H3 data is in 
Chapter III. 
D3.  There was a lot of turnover in team membership.  Disagree somewhat 
D4.  The team leader had both design & production experience.  Neither agree nor 
disagree.  Developer team leader had excellent design experience; but production 
experience was associated with smaller systems. 
D5. The team leader had very high technical competence.  Strongly agree 
D6. Some key technical skills were not represented on the team itself. Disagree 
somewhat 
D8. Professionals were split across too many different tasks & teams.  Neither 
agree nor disagree 
  D10. Key members continued through pre-production planning and testing.  Agree 
somewhat 
 
3. Design to Manufacturing Linkage? 
This covers survey questions F1, F2, F3, F10 through F13, W1, W2, W16, W17, 
and W18. 
 
Questions F1 through F13 use the following responses: 






Don’t know  
Not Applicable 
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 F1. Went to the shop floor to meet about related production processes. Many 
Times 
F2. Asked for supplier comments & suggestions on design choices.  Several times 
F3.  Showed & discussed physical models of new components with suppliers.  
Once or Twice 
F10.  Passed around physical prototypes during joint discussions.  Many Times 
F11. Held planning meetings that included both design & production people. 
Once or Twice 
F12. Explored choices together with computational models or analytic tools. 
Never      The Manufacturing engineers reviewed prints all throughout the project, but 
they didn’t use computational models or analytic tools.  Computer tools didn’t exist at the 
time, and they didn’t have any manufacturing analytical tools – 1970s and early 1980s. 
F13. Had test articles or pre-production parts to discuss and examine jointly.  
Once or Twice 
 
Please check (9) all stages when the activity occurred. 
SP D TP  
Selection Development Transition  
 
 Early Middle Later  (Never) (DK/
N/A) 
W1. When did production 
representatives participate 
regularly? 
 X  X    
W2. When did team members 
meet with production on shop 
floor? 
   X X   
Table 13.   Data for Questions W1 and W2 
 
Relationship & Activities between Engineering Design & Production/Program 
These questions are different because they focus only on joint meetings or 
discussions that included both DESIGN personnel and people from PRODUCTION 

















 Please check (9) all stages when the activity occurred. 
SP D TP  
Selection Development Transition  
 
 Early Middle Later  (Never) (DK/
N/A) 
W16. When did the team & 
technical professionals from 
Production have unscheduled & 
informal joint conversations 
about the project? 
 X X X    
W17. When were analytic 
engineering tools used jointly by 
Design and Production to 
explore options together? 
      X 
W18. When were prototypes and 
parts used in joint discussions? 
   X X   
Table 14.   Data for Questions W16, W17, and W18 
 
4. Design to Supplier Linkage? 
This covers survey questions F20 through F23, W26, W27, W28, and B10. 
 
SHARED DESIGN-SUPPLIER ACTIVITIES during System Development.  Now 
only count joint meetings or discussions that included personnel from both DESIGN and 
SUPPLIERS. 
Questions F20 through F23 use the following responses: 






Don’t know  
Not Applicable 
F20. Passed around physical prototypes during joint discussions.  Never 
F21. Held planning meetings that included both design and suppliers.  Once or 
Twice 
F22. Explored choices together with computational models or analytic tools.  
Never 
F23. Had test articles or pre-production parts to discuss and examine jointly. 
Many Times 
Design engineers and suppliers worked closely together.  This was a very unique 
design so the suppliers were designing/tailoring their hardware for this specific job in 









 Please check (9) all stages when the activity occurred. 
SP D TP  
Selection Development Transition  
 
 Early Middle Later  (Never) (DK/
N/A) 
W26. When did the team & 
technical professionals from 
Suppliers have unscheduled & 
informal joint conversations 
about the project? 
X X X X    
W27. When were analytic 
engineering tools used jointly by 
Design and Suppliers to explore 
options together? 
      X 
W28. When were prototypes and 
parts used in joint discussions? 
   X X   
Table 15.   Data for Questions W26, W27, and W28 
 
Did this problem come up during this project? 
B10. One or more suppliers did not meet their commitments.  Significant effort 
(was needed) 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS 
This section will analyze the effectiveness of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) in 
terms of (1) IPT approach used, (2) Proper staffing of IPT, (3) Design to manufacturing 
linkage, and (4) Design to supplier linkage. 
 
1. IPT Approach Used? 
This was before the advent of the formally-recognized IPT system that has totally 
transformed the Government and business.  However, there was then a realization that 
integrating people from many disciplines was a useful technique.  Though they did not 
call them IPT’s, the TADS / PNVS program frequently used multidisciplinary working 
groups to solve problems.  These groups were not formally established, though people 
from different groups were invited.  This often happens in IPT’s today – certain 
disciplines may not be represented either because there is no interest or due to lack of 
funds to attend IPT meetings. 
40 
A similar problem both then and today is that often the membership of an IPT 
varies.  The membership charter may call for one (or more) person from a specific 
 organization, but it may be a different person each time.  If this happens, there is no 
gradual increase in either the working relationship between members or the skill of 
members.  Different people from the same organization may have completely different 
backgrounds and styles, and can cause disruption when they contradict previous members 
of their own organization.  These changes of direction can be very disruptive. 
Also, such teaming was more likely on critical aspects of the program.  
Performance of the system was critical, so a multidisciplinary team was used. 
Multidisciplinary work is not confined to meetings and formal groups.  Most of 
the people on the program were in the same building, within a short walk of each other.  
This fosters quick, informal meetings and also camaraderie and group cohesion.  
Additionally, many people had worked there for some time, even before the project 
began.  Thus, they were undoubtedly experienced with working together.  Some people 
were in another building in the same city, so it was not too difficult to have face-to-face 
team meetings on short notice. 
The success of any team depends on the leadership of the team leader(s) and also 
the skills of the team members.  During development of the TADS/PNVS, the team 
leader was good at resolving technical disagreements. 
But the path can be rocky in arriving at agreement.  When you are trying to 
integrate a lot of technology and the requirements they actualize, there are often trade-
offs.  Compromising can be difficult for some people.  Occasionally, someone feels that 
their idea must take precedence, and some good (competing) ideas can be lost.  Once or 
twice, it was necessary to get management help to resolve disagreements. 
Usually management reviews were constructive.  They had formal reviews at key 
decision points.  The Government PM reported problems that went up to Army leaders.  
Most of the time, it was easy to get outside help. 
In the days before IPTs, there were lots of meetings.  These meetings may not 
have been the most effective solution to solving problems, but they did solve some.  The 
table below lists a range of types of Pre-IPT Groups. 
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 Type of Group Level of Analysis 
Staff Meeting Information passing / Problem solving 
Program Status Meeting 
(Dog and Pony Show) 
Information passing –Very high-level / 
Critical review 
Product / Functional Status 
Meeting (Low-level) 
Information passing –Lower-level / 
Critical review 
Working Groups Problem Solving and Information 
passing –Lower-level  
Board Approvals: 
Emergency ECP 
Problem solving / Critical review 
Table 16.   Pre-IPT Groups 
 
These groups differ from each other in the level of the group, the level of analysis, 
and whether they include both Government and contractors.  Typical staff meetings were 
simply for information transfer, mostly downwards.  It was a way to pass the word to the 
troops with the least work for the chief.  But occasionally, there were problems the boss 
brought up and people would work on them together, suggesting strategies, evaluating 
alternatives, offering related information, etc.  Both Government and contractors had 
their own staff meetings, typically with no outsiders. 
The typical Program Status Meeting (a.k.a. “Dog and Pony Show”) was a 
contractor to Government interchange.  It was for passing very high-level information.  It 
really was not possible to solve many problems because of the large number of people 
present, although action items could be assigned. 
Product / Functional Status Meetings were more low-level.  They were also for 
information passing, but at a lower level.  Occasionally they were conducted like working 
group meetings.  Often both have Government and contractors. 
Working group meetings were where lots of problems were resolved.  Sometimes 
all the necessary functional specialties were present.  However, most only contained one 
or two specialties, and other functional types were ignored.  Often there were both 





2. Proper Staffing of IPT? 
Because this was a major program for the developer, most “key skills” essential to 
the project were available.  Some key skills were not on the team itself, but had to be 
requested when needed.  Some people were split across too many different tasks & teams.  
This was limited to the microwave electronics hybrids design group and the printed 
circuit layout design people. Those were both functional groups, and the TADS/PNVS 
group didn’t have enough work to justify keeping them on their team.  But they had as 
good of a priority with these groups as any other project in the company in Orlando. 
There was some personnel turnover, which can disrupt the schedule of the team.  
Many people continued on the project through pre-production planning and testing. 
The developer team leader had high technical competence.  He had excellent 
design experience; however, his production experience was mostly on smaller systems. 
 
3. Design to Manufacturing Linkage? 
The developer had a good relationship with suppliers, production, design, and 
upper management.  Designers asked suppliers for their comments and suggestions.  
Occasionally, they passed around the models to the suppliers for their comments. 
Getting feedback from suppliers often has a good affect on buyer-supplier 
relations.  Instead of being just a customer, the supplier sees the buyer as somebody who 
produces a useful product.  The product has value, and therefore manufacturing and 
delivering the supplies needed to make it, also has value.  Additionally, the feedback can 
generate improvements in use of the supplied parts, or in manufacture of those parts. 
Production processes are very important.  Design engineers went to the shop floor 
many times to discuss them with manufacturing specialists.  The team members met with 
production on the shop floor during the latter part of the development phase and during 
the transition to production phase.  The production representatives participated regularly 
in the early and latter parts for the development phase. 
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 Though the manufacturing engineers in the production group reviewed 
engineering drawings, they did not use computational models or analytic tools.  
Computer tools were not yet available, nor were there any of the manufacturing tools 
which exist today. 
During joint discussions, they passed around prototypes of smaller components.  
This facilitated understanding and stimulated discussion.  A few times, they held 
planning meetings with both design & production people.  The design team and technical 
professionals from production held unscheduled and informal joint conversations about 
the project throughout the development phase. 
Occasionally, they had test articles or pre-production parts to discuss and examine 
jointly.  Prototypes and parts were used in joint discussions late in the development phase 
and in the transition to production phase. 
 
4. Design to Supplier Linkage? 
During system development, the design engineers and suppliers worked closely 
together.  During joint discussions, they frequently had test articles or pre-production 
parts to discuss and examine jointly.  The suppliers modified their hardware for this 
specific job to satisfy the developer.  They invited suppliers to planning meetings a few 
times.  However, this teamwork did not extend to using computational models or analytic 
tools. 
The design team and technical professionals from suppliers had unscheduled and 
informal joint conversations about the project during the selection phase and all though 
the development phase.  Prototypes and parts were used in joint discussions during the 
latter development phase and the transition to production.  Significant effort was needed 
to overcome suppliers’ not meeting delivery commitments. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS ON INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS 
This early usage of teams, similar to IPT’s, was fairly successful.  The teams 
often did not work as well as they could have because there was no firm policy to have all 
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 needed disciplines present.  However, because the program was large and important for 
the developer, they got most of the people and equipment that they needed.  This section 
draws conclusions concerning the maturity of the critical technologies. 
 
1. IPT Approach Used? 
TADS/PNVS employed multidisciplinary teams, also known as cross-functional 
groups.  Because these groups were not formally chartered, if an organization did not 
send anyone – due to lack of manpower or travel funding – then that group’s views and 
expertise might not be included. 
A change in membership can cripple the effectiveness of an IPT.  The synergism 
that comes from working with known people over time is lost – people are not 
interchangeable parts.  Varying direction from an organization can also cause all their 
directions to be ignored.  This often happens in IPTs today. 
The successful use of multidisciplinary teams on this and other commercial and 
DoD programs led to the large-scale adoption of Integrated Product Teams.  
Multidisciplinary teams were used on the more important projects.  Because they were 
successful, they began to be used on more and more projects.  Additionally, the close 
proximity of the team also fostered informal multidisciplinary effort.  It also engendered 
camaraderie and group cohesion. 
The TADS/PNVS developer had strong leadership.  Usually the group was able to 
resolve differences of opinion, but occasionally upper management had to get involved.  
Program reviews were fairly good at eliciting problems, and the channels to upper Army 
management were quite effective. 
Pre-IPT groups addressed a variety of problems, large and small, with a fair 
amount of success.  Groups differed in the formality of their organization, in the level of 
analysis they required, and whether they include both Government and contractors.  Since 
there was no formal structure, some groups were only able to handle smaller problems, 
while others handled larger problems with considerable success. 
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 2. Proper Staffing of IPT? 
Most of the necessary skills needed for the project were actually on the project 
team, and a few other skills were provided from outside with a sufficiently high priority.  
Many of the personnel continued working on the program throughout the development 
and testing period, though there was some turnover.  The developer team leader had 
excellent technical development skills, though his production experience was mostly on 
smaller systems. 
 
3. Design to Manufacturing Linkage? 
The developer worked and communicated well with internal groups (production, 
design, and upper management) as well as suppliers.  They involved suppliers in the 
design process to good effect.  Occasionally, smaller prototype components, assemblies, 
test articles or pre-production parts were passed around to facilitate understanding.  
Production representatives participated in the design process; and production and design 
groups met many times to discuss production processes.  Manufacturing engineers also 
reviewed engineering drawings; the more automated verification techniques that are 
available today didn't exist then. 
 
4. Design to Supplier Linkage? 
The developer and its suppliers worked fairly well together, on either a formal or 
an informal basis, examining prototype parts together and participating in joint planning.  
However, they didn’t use computational models or analytic tools, which were only just 
becoming available.  And significant effort was needed for suppliers to overcome 
problems in meeting delivery commitments. 
 
In summary, the multidisciplinary teams eventually evolved into integrated 
product teams.  These teams were useful TADS/PNVS development tools.  These teams 
possibly were not as effective as a formal IPT, but by integrating many disciplines, they 
were able to solve many complex problems. 
46 
  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. IPT Representation: 
Study past and present IPTs, or groups not formally chartered, to determine how 
representation of functional disciplines affects the IPTs effectiveness.  If an organization 
didn’t send anyone to IPT meetings – due to lack of manpower or travel funding – then 
that group’s views and expertise might not be included. 
 
2. Varying Membership: 
Study effectiveness of past and present IPTs, or groups not formally chartered.  
Some organizations send a different person to represent them to each meeting.  Changes 
in membership can cripple the effectiveness of an IPT.  Varying instructions from an 
organization can also cause all their directions to be ignored. 
 
3. Prime Contractor / Subcontractor Cooperation: 
Study how Prime and subcontractors are exchanging more information on their 
process and products.  Compare the efficiency of the design process in terms of problems 
found early versus late in the process.  Also, compare this to the Japanese lean 
manufacturing model for supplier relations. 
 
4. Manufacturing Processes: 
Study how prime contractors and subcontractors employ mass production 
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 VI. KEY PROGRAM MANAGER ISSUE 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This chapter answers the secondary research question, “What was the key issue 
that the PM had to deal with during the project and how was it dealt with?”  I will 
introduce the data, then analyze it, and finally draw conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 6.   AH-64A Video Interfaces, from TADS/PNVS Interfaces with other Mission 




1. Key Issue for PM? 
This contains survey question I2, only. 
 
I2.  What was the most difficult problem the Project Manager faced, how was the 
problem dealt with, and what was the impact of the problem on the project outcome? 
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This quote is from the government responder. 
  
“The biggest problem was the cost overruns and the underlying reasons for these 
overruns in development.  The source of these cost overruns was due to a couple of 
factors.  The primary problem was probably associated with the acquisition approach.  
After the fly-off, there was a down select to the winning contractor.  That down select was 
made in the form of the contract award for the maturity phase of the development 
program. 
 
Each contractor submitted a proposal for the maturity phase as part of the down-
select competition.  It certainly was not in the contractor’s best interest at that stage to 
cost the program in their proposals to fully cover all risk areas.  First, the contractor 
would not go out of his way to highlight areas of risk that the Government team had not 
identified and secondly, for those areas of risk that were identified the contractors did not 
want to indicate the full cost of the risk thereby putting themselves at a substantial 
competitive disadvantage for the down-select (both by proposing a higher cost than their 
competitor and by highlighting greater technical risk with their designs that required 
greater funding in the maturity phase to correct). 
 
Having said all of this, I do not feel that the acquisition approach was necessarily 
the wrong one because the approach with the competitive fly-off and a subsequent 
maturity phase is designed to significantly reduce the risk that the developed systems will 
not meet performance goals. 
 
Since the TADS/PNVS was the number one riskiest technology in the AAH 
program, this was an appropriate approach, and one that was ultimately successful.  I 
think that both the Government team and the contractor underestimated the effort it 
would take to implement the maturity phase design changes, meet all performance goals, 
develop test equipment, and transition to production.  The project manager, therefore, 
had to deal with all the issues that came up because there was more effort required to get 
the job done in the required time frame than had been planned for.  The solutions to 
almost all problems resulted in increased cost.” 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF KEY PROGRAM MANAGER ISSUE 
What was the key issue that the PM had to deal with during the project and how 
was it dealt with?  The key issue was cost overruns, which were due to several factors.  
The developers needed to win a competitive contract based on cost.  And if a contractor 
explored and expounded the risks, their cost would realistically be higher than their 
competitors.  Please note that Chapter IV, User Support and Funding Stability, also 
relates to funding. 
 
Cost overruns and lowest bidder who hides risks: 
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 Developers downplayed risks brought up by the Government, because by fully 
expounding the risks of their design, the developer would have shown that their proposal 
was under-funded, so risks were not really explored or mentioned.  This scoring of risks 
was held against the contractor's design, rather than recognizing that the risks are inherent 
in the Government's project requirements.  This may have been the best contract vehicle 
at the time, but it does tend to reward the hiding of information. 
It was in the interests of neither the Government PMO nor the Prime contractor, 
to have a reasonable program cost at the beginning of the contract.  The Prime wanted to 
win the contract in a competitive environment.  The Government PMO was trying to get 
the best value for the Government. 
Reprogramming funds for a program is expensive.  Besides the schedule loss 
while you are going through the effort, there is the schedule loss due to going back and 
doing risk reduction you should have done earlier, acquiring parts/equipment/facilities on 
short notice, and also redesigning the system.  Each of these four activities has an 
associated cost.  Additionally, there is the cost of materials acquired but no longer 
needed.  Doing all these cost and schedule activities later in the program always costs 
more than if they were on the program schedule from day one. 
Even though the PMO ‘knew’ that the program probably could not succeed at the 
initial cost, and that the Government would have to provide more money, the strategy 
was that the profit to the contractor was based on the initial program cost.  It is arguable 
whether this savings in profit to the contractor was offset by the cost of the inefficiency 
of the total program turbulence and review resulting from cost overruns and 
reprogramming additional funds.  Sadly, cost overruns on the TADS/PNVS were a 
common occurrence, given the way the financial system was set up. 
Although making contract decisions based entirely upon cost was common at the 
time, today more contracting decisions are based upon a variety of other factors, 
including technical parameters. 
The TADS / PNVS was recognized as the number one riskiest technology on the 
AAH program, and the system was ultimately successful, though at double the original 
contract price.  However, significant process improvements are possible in the 
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 development and contracting strategy.  For example, development contracts are routinely 
based on more than just cost.  Reporting risks can be scored as value-added information.  
And these risks can be used to evaluate all contracts, not just the contractor who 
mentioned them – although they may not be inherent in other contractors' designs. 
The Government and developers should enter teaming relationships early to 
identify risk areas, and the developers should be rewarded for this value-added activity.  
Finding technical risks later in the program is a common occurrence, but it should be 
minimized as much as possible.  Some programs are cancelled because technical risks 
grow beyond the end worth of the system.  Finding risks earlier saves money, because 
fixing something is always less costly at the beginning of a program.  Going back to the 
Government for more funds, or to the PM, to higher headquarters, or to Congress, could 
be a decision point for canceling the program. 
 
The Prime and Subcontracts: 
TADS/PNVS Development contract was a Prime contract, not a subcontract to 
Hughes Helicopters.  Both the TADS/PNVS and the Hughes Apache contract had clauses 
in them for an Integration and Configuration Working Group.  Integration is a potential 
problem. 
Having direct contract with a developer of a subsystem has advantages and 
disadvantages.  It gives the Government more control to have a direct contract, more 
control over their development processes, and over the contract type.  TADS/PNVS was 
the highest risk item on the Apache development program, and warranted a separate 
project office.  Having this separate office, and a separate prime contract is more work, 
but it increases the Government's ability to control the risk. 
But then there are questions concerning how you integrate the subsystem into the 
prime contractor's system or vehicle.  You can put a clause in the prime's contract that 
they must integrate the subsystem, and work with the other contractor to do so, but there 
are still some liability issues that may arise.  If redesign is necessary in order to interface 
the subsystem, then the Government could be liable for the cost.  The solution that the 
TADS/PNVS program chose handled this problem very well. 
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 Primes still use fixed-cost contracts for subcontracts today.  The Government has 
sworn off fixed-cost contracts, because development is too high risk.  However, 
subcontracts are frequently where the highest risk parts of the program lie.  Often the 
prime's share of the work, wiring the vehicle, and installing the components, is a much 
lower risk activity. 
 
Cost Probabilities: 
The probable program cost at the start, based on risk and cost drivers, can be 
graphed – see the figure below.  It would probably be some type of bell-shaped curve, 
with maximum probability in the middle.  The four vertical lines represent the 1st, 5th, 
50th, and 99th percentile probabilities of the program cost.  Starting off the program with a 
budget at the 5th percentile probability is quite risky. 
 




















Figure 7.   Contract Costs Graph 
 
One problem with setting the contract price at the 5th percentile probability point 
is that it forces the program to “restructure,” “realign,” or “reprogram” too often.  This 
effort is a financial drain on the program’s cost and schedule, as well as an 
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 embarrassment to all concerned.  And of course, little program work is done while you 
are involved in the meetings and discussions of the restructuring, though you are 'burning' 
cost and schedule. 
Starting off at the 5th percentile probability level also causes some risky behavior.  
If you had more money, you could undertake some risk-diminishing strategies earlier in 
the program, and possibly avoid some schedule slips.  Doing risk reduction later on costs 
more, because it may invalidate design decisions, and all later design and development 
work based on those decisions.  At the lower budget cost, you are required to allocate 
almost all your resources on well-understood requirements, which generally have 
predictable costs, and very little for risk reduction efforts. 
It is better to start the program off with a budget nearer the 50th percentile 
probability.  This will allow funding risk reduction studies and an emergency funding 
reserve.  Just as the AAH PMO had a financial reserve, the contractor PMO will establish 
a financial reserve within his own budget. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Cost overruns are a large concern in Government programs.  TADS / PNVS cost 
concerns stemmed from hiding or downplaying risks even before the contractor won the 
contract. 
Playing the game to get a contract started for less than the contractor needs is 
risky – cost overruns are likely.  Most companies that have sued the Government to 
recover cost overruns have succeeded.  Realistic contract prices at the beginning are more 
cost effective, avoiding costly reprogramming/restructuring, the political turmoil inherent 
in asking congress for more money, and the risk of contract disputes in court. 
Programs are very rarely cancelled for cost considerations.  Once a program is 
started and gains its military, congressional, and defense contractor adherents, it is 
difficult to cancel.  Although making contract decisions based entirely upon cost was 
common at the time, today more contracting decisions are based on a variety of other 
factors, including technical parameters. 
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 Best Value is not always guaranteed by choosing the lowest bidder on a contract.  
Program managers need to reduce risks, if their program is to succeed.  One possibility is 
that the request for proposal could request that the technical risks inherent in the project 
requirements be listed separately by a contractor, and compared to other contractors’ 
proposals.  This could be scored in favor of the contractor – they should get the contract 
because they understand the problem better.  Of course, they should also propose how to 
deal with these risks. 
Prime contracts and subcontracts should be considered for high-risk subsystems.  
If a prime contract is used, it adds workload to the Government, but can lower total 
program risks if effectively managed.  Integration is a bigger issue with multiple prime 
contracts on one program.  If the work is subcontracted, the Government should consider 
what type of the contract the prime will use, and realize they will have less control over 
development. 
If most programs go over cost, then the system is probably too risky.  It is better 
to predict the cost realistically, and commit the appropriate amount.  Some budget people 
advocate squeezing a program a bit to encourage cost reduction efforts, but cutting back 
by 50% is not realistic.  The 5th percentile of the probable cost is too low.  Planners 
should try to target the 40th to 50th percentile of the probable cost.  But even then, some 
programs will go over the contract price, and a program manager or his PEO could have a 
contingency fund.  Starting with a reasonable contract price allows more realistic 
planning and earlier risk reduction efforts. 
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Financial Management and Contract Types: 
Study how contract types have changed over the years from 1980 to the present, 
and the policies for use of these contract types.  Study how program financial 
management varies with contract type, and what affect this has on the program manager's 




2. Prime and Subcontracts: 
Study how some programs are run with only one prime contract, and a variety of 
subcontracts, and other have many prime contracts.  Study ease of integration and 
management of development risks. 
 
3. Study Program Risk Reduction Proposals in Contracts: 
Study how various DoD contracts have proposed reducing risks, and how 




 VII. SIMULATION AND TESTING STRATEGY 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
This chapter answers the primary research question, “What was the simulation 
and testing strategy for the system, and did that strategy adequately evaluate the system 




Figure 8.   TADS Automatic Test Station Interface, from Interface Control Document for the 





In addition to data from the combined survey, I included some related information 
from a General Accounting Office (GAO) study on the DoD testing process.  This study 
contrasts the test processes during product development, between civilian company 
testing and DoD testing, and shows how DoD testing can be improved. 
 
1. Test Approach Used? 
This covers survey questions V1 through V15, Validation Activities. 
 
Validation Activities: Testing and Simulation 
V1. Was a failure modes and effects analysis done on the system?  Yes 
 V1a. If yes, was it used to help establish the test plan?  Yes 
This analysis drove the test requirements for production test equipment and for 
fielded automatic test equipment. 
This analysis drove the test requirements for production test equipment and for 
fielded automatic test equipment.  The FMECA looks for things likely to break, and its 
results influenced qualification tests and simulation.  Performance tests were run under 
extreme vibration conditions.  Production planning was done during development, as a 
logistics effort to identify support requirements.  They used the same test equipment in 
production as at the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) facility. 
 
For individual components: 
Questions V2 through V6 were answered using these possible answers.  More than 
one answer is permitted. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 








V2. Was there testing to see if the individual components of the system 
worked? What organization(s) did this testing?  Prime and Suppliers  
 V3. Were there simulations run to see if the individual components of the 
system worked? What organization(s)did these simulations?  Prime and Suppliers 
 
For integrated components in controlled setting: 
V4. Were the components tested working together in a controlled setting? 
What organization(s) did this testing? Prime, Suppliers, and Other Government 
organization 
V5. Were there simulations of the components working together in a 
controlled setting? What organization(s) did this?  Prime and Army center/lab 
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 For integrated components in a realistic setting: 
V6. Was there testing of the components working together in a realistic 
setting?  What organization(s) did this testing?  Prime and Army center/lab 
 
V7. Was a hardware-in-the-loop type systems integration simulation laboratory 
used?  
 V7a. To see if the individual components of the system worked:  Yes. 
 V7b. To see if integrated components worked in controlled setting: Yes. 
TADS/PNVS components were tested in the completed system using  “aircraft 
simulator” test equipment.  The TADS/PNVS itself was testing in the aircraft 
manufacturer’s Systems Integration Laboratory. 
 
V8. Recalling the total effort (100%) spent on testing and simulations, please 
allocate the percent of that total that were:  
 15 % spent to see if the individual components of the system worked 
   5 % spent to see if integrated components worked in controlled setting 
 80 % spent to see if integrated components worked in a realistic setting 
  (0) % Spent on any other validation purpose 
 100 % 
 
Questions V9 through V15 were answered using these possible answers: 














V9.  Knowledge from validation work was used consistently to improve 
components and system.  Strongly agree. 
V10.  Project test philosophy was to “Break it big early.”  Agree somewhat. 
V11. Component and system maturity were validated at the right times in the 
program.  Strongly agree. 
V12.  The project and the testing community had an adversarial relationship.   
Strongly disagree.   
V13.  Most project validation events produced quality results.  Agree somewhat. 
V14.  The project didn’t recognize important lessons that validation work 
uncovered.  Strongly disagree. 
V15.  Sometimes the project settled for less than the best validation method.  
Strongly disagree. 
 
2. GAO Research: 
This data is excerpts from: General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, Best 
Practices, A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System 
Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199, July 2000. 
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Report Abstract: This report examines (1) how the conduct of testing and 
evaluation affects commercial and Defense Department (DOD) program 
outcomes, (2) how best commercial testing and evaluation practices 
compare with DOD's, and (3) what factors account for the differences in 
these practices. GAO found that commercial firms use testing to expose 
problems earlier than the DOD programs GAO visited. Commercial firms' 
testing and evaluation validates products' maturity based on three levels at 
specific points in time, which works to preclude "late-cycle churn" or the 
scramble to fix a significant problem discovered late in development. 
Late-cycle churn has been a fairly common occurrence on DOD weapon 
systems, where tests of a full system identify problems that often could 
have been found earlier. DOD's response to such test results typically is to 
expend more time and money to solve the problems--only rarely are 
programs terminated. The differences in testing practices reflect the 
different demands commercial firms and DOD impose on program 
managers. Leading commercial firms insist that a product satisfy the 
customer and make a profit. Success is threatened if unknowns about a 
product are not resolved early when costs are low and more options are 
available.  Testing is constructive and eliminates unknowns. Success for a 
weapons system is centered on providing a superior capability within 
perceived time and funding limits. Testing plays a less constructive role, 
because test results often become directly linked to funding and other key 
decisions and can jeopardize program support. Such a role creates a more 
adversarial relationship between testers and program managers. 
 
Purpose Despite good intentions and some progress by the Department of 
Defense (DOD), weapon system programs still suffer from persistent 
problems associated with late or incomplete testing. Often, the fate of a 
program is jeopardized by unexpectedly poor test results. In such cases, 
testing becomes a watershed event that attracts unwanted attention from 
decision makers and critics. The discovery of problems in complex 
products is a normal part of any development process, and testing is 
perhaps the most effective tool for discovering such problems. However, 
why surprises in testing repeatedly occur and why such results polarize 
organizations into proponents and critics of programs have proven elusive 
questions to answer. Indeed, numerous solutions proposed over the years 
by different DOD leaders and distinguished outside panels have not had 
much effect. 
 
Lessons learned by leading commercial firms in developing new products 
are applicable to the management and testing of weapon systems. These 
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 firms achieve the type of outcomes DOD seeks: they develop more 
sophisticated products faster and less expensively than their predecessors. 
Commercial firms have found constructive ways of conducting testing and 
evaluation that help them avoid being surprised by problems late in a 
product’s development. In response to a request from the Chairman and 
the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and 
Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, GAO 
examined (1) how the conduct of testing and evaluation affects 
commercial and DOD program outcomes, (2) how best commercial testing 
and evaluation practices compare with DOD’s, and (3) what factors 
account for the differences in these practices. 
 
Background The fundamental purpose of testing and evaluation does not 
differ for military and commercial products. Testing is the main 
instrument used to gauge the progress being made when an idea or concept 
is translated into an actual product.... In both DOD and commercial firms, 
product testing is conducted by organizations separate from those 
responsible for managing product development. 
Results in Brief For the leading commercial firms GAO visited, the proof 
of testing and evaluation lies in whether a product experiences what one 
firm called “late-cycle churn,” or the scramble to fix a significant problem 
discovered late in development…. 
On the weapon programs, system-level testing carried a greater share of 
the burden. Earlier tests were delayed, skipped, or not conducted in a way 
that advanced knowledge.... Leading commercial firms have learned to 
insist that a product satisfy the customer and make a profit. Success is 
threatened if managers are unduly optimistic or if unknowns about a 
product are not resolved early, when costs are low and more options are 
available. The role of testing under these circumstances is constructive, for 
it helps eliminate unknowns. Product managers view testers and realistic 
test plans as contributing to a product’s success. Success for a weapon 
system program is different; it centers on attempting to provide a superior 
capability within perceived time and funding limits. Success is influenced 
by the competition for funding and the quest for top performance; 
delivering the product late and over cost does not necessarily threaten 
success. Testing plays a less constructive role in DOD because a failure in 
a key test can jeopardize program support. Specifically, test results often 
become directly linked to funding and other key decisions for programs. 





Problems Found Late in Development Signal Weaknesses in 
Testing and Evaluation 
Over the years, GAO found numerous examples of late-cycle churn in 
DOD programs, regardless of their size, complexity, or product type. More 
recent examples include the following: 
• The DarkStar unmanned aerial vehicle crashed during initial flight tests. 
DOD spent twice the planned money and time to redesign and retest the 
aircraft, eventually terminating the program. 
Testing Early to Validate Product Knowledge Is a Best Practice 
Leading commercial firms GAO visited think in terms of validating that a 
product works as intended and use testing and evaluation as a means to 
that end. To limit the burden on the product’s third maturity level 
(operating in a realistic environment), leading firms ensure that (1) the 
right validation events—tests, simulations, and other means for 
demonstrating product maturity—occur at the right times, (2) each 
validation event produces quality results, and (3) the knowledge gained 
from an event is used to improve the product. The firms hold challenging 
tests early to expose weaknesses in a product’s design. AT&T refers to 
this as a “break it big early” philosophy…. 
 
Different Incentives Make Testing a More Constructive Factor 
in Commercial Programs Than in Weapon System Programs 
 
… Test results tend to become scorecards that demonstrate whether the 
program is ready to proceed or to receive the next increment of funding. 
Whereas testing and evaluation of commercial products mainly benefits 
the product manager, in DOD, testing and evaluation is more for the 
benefit of the testers and decision makers above the program manager. 
Managers thus have incentives to postpone difficult tests and to limit open 
communication about test results. Managers in both the DarkStar 
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 unmanned aerial vehicle and the Standoff Land Attack Missile programs 
also overruled testers because of funding and schedule pressures. 
 
Recommendations To lessen the dependence on testing late in 
development and to foster a more constructive relationship between 
program managers and testers, GAO recommends that the Secretary of 
Defense instruct acquisition managers to structure test plans around the 
attainment of increasing levels of product maturity, orchestrate the right 
mix of tools to validate these maturity levels, and build and resource 
acquisition strategies around this approach. GAO also recommends that 
validation of lower levels of product maturity not be deferred to the third 
level. Finally, GAO recommends that the Secretary require that weapon 
systems demonstrate a specified level of product maturity before major 
programmatic approvals.” 
 
Chapter 2. Problems Found Late in Development Signal 
Weaknesses in Testing and Evaluation 
… Problems are most devastating when they delay product delivery, 
increase product cost, or “escape” to the customer. 
Chapter4: Different Incentives Make Testing a More 
Constructive Factor in Commercial Programs Than in Weapon 
System Programs 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, before he took office, pinpointed the following differences in 
commercial and DOD testing: 
63 
In the commercial world, the reason for testing and evaluating a new item 
is to determine where it will not work and to continuously improve it . . . . 
Thus testing and evaluation is primarily for the purpose of making the best 
possible product, and making it as robust as possible . . . . By contrast, 
testing and evaluation in the Department of Defense has tended to be a 
final exam, or an audit, to see if a product works. Tests are not seen as a 
critical element in enhancing the development process; the assumption is 
that the product will work and it usually does. Under these conditions, the 
less testing the better—preferably none at all. This rather perverse use of 
testing causes huge cost and time increases on the defense side, since tests 
 are postponed until the final exam and flaws are found late rather than 
early.1     (1 Defense Conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of 
Democracy; MIT Press, 1995.) 
Commercial Incentives Foster Candor and Realism in Product 
Validation 
Once a company decides to launch a product development, strong 
incentives, grounded in the business case, encourage a focus on product 
validation to keep the program on track. To meet market demands, leading 
commercial companies plan around comparatively short cycle times— 
often less than 2 years—to complete a product’s development. These short 
time frames make customer acceptance and return on investment close at 
hand. Consequently, production looms as a near-term reality that 
continues to influence subsequent product decisions within the framework 
of the business case. 
To deliver the product on time, commercial firms insist on validating the 
maturity of technologies before they are allowed onto a new product. 
Testing Is Perceived as Impeding the Success of 
Weapon System Programs 
The basic management goal for a weapon system program in DOD is 
similar to that of a commercial product: to develop and deliver a product 
that meets the customer’s needs. However, the pressures of successfully 
competing for the funds to start and sustain a weapon system program 
create incentives for launching programs that embody more technical 
unknowns and less knowledge about the performance and production risks 
they entail. On the basis of our present and previous work, as well as our 
review of outside studies, such as those sponsored by DOD, we have 
identified several key factors that affect the business case for starting a 
new weapon system program. 
Annual funding is approved Æ 
User requirements exist Æ 
Program promises best capability Æ 
Program looks affordable Æ(back to beginning) 
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Testing Can Pose a Serious Threat to a DOD Program 
Within the DOD business case for the programs we reviewed, test results 
tended to become scorecards that demonstrated to decision makers that the 
program was ready to proceed to the next acquisition phase or to receive 
the next increment of funding. As a result, testing operated under a penalty 
environment; if tests were not passed, the program might look less 
attractive and be vulnerable to funding cuts. Managers thus had incentives 
to postpone difficult tests and limit open communication about test results. 
Under these conditions, demonstrations that show enough progress to 
continue the program are preferred over actual tests against criteria, which 
can reveal shortfalls. Accordingly, DOD testers are often seen as 
adversaries to the program. In general, testers are often organizationally 
removed from the design and development effort and are viewed as 
outsiders. Unlike their commercial counterparts, they do not have a strong 
voice in early program planning decisions. As a result, their authority or 
influence is limited, and they are often overruled in decisions to proceed 
with programs despite testing weaknesses. 
The role testing plays in DOD programs was analyzed in a September 
1999 report from the Defense Science Board.3 The Board concluded that 
the “response to perceived test failures is often inappropriate and 
counterproductive.” Instead of using testing, especially in the early stages, 
as a vital learning mechanism and an opportunity to expand product 
knowledge, testing is often used as a basis for withholding funding, costly 
rescheduling, or threats of cancellation. 
DOD Testing Impaired by Optimism and Insufficient Resources 
Although DOD does extensive test and resource planning, the planning on 
the weapon systems we reviewed was often undercut by unrealistic 
assumptions. DOD’s acquisition regulation 5000.2R requires formal test 
plans and resource estimates for every weapon system program that must 
be reviewed and approved by numerous organizations. This formal 
process does not guarantee that the program will comply with the plan or 
receive the resources requested or that the plan itself is realistic. On the 
programs we reviewed, pressures to keep schedule and cost estimates as 
low as possible forced managers into optimistic plans that presume 
success instead of anticipating problems. Test resources and schedules 
were assigned accordingly. The resultant test plans eventually proved 
unexecutable because they underestimated the complexity and the 
resources necessary to validate the product’s maturity. Typically, the time 
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 and money allocated to testing was more a by-product than a centerpiece 
of the product development estimate. 
 
The DarkStar test approach had similar constraints. The contractor 
developed a test plan that accommodated cost and schedule limits, but did 
not address the range of technical parameters that needed to be 
investigated. Problems were noted during testing, but because of schedule 
and cost pressures, minimal attempts were made to correct them. The 
safety investigation board, which investigated after the vehicle crashed, 
reported that “scheduling was dictated by programmatic pressures rather 
than sound engineering processes” and “the overriding driver repeatedly 
appeared to be schedule and budget.” The funding and schedule 
constraints were imposed without considering what resources were needed 
to adequately mature and integrate DarkStar components into a system. 
Ironically, the resources to redesign and retest the system—double the 
original estimate—were made available only after serious problems 
occurred under the original plan. 
Conclusions 
For testing and evaluation to become part of a constructive effort to 
validate the maturity of new weapon systems in DOD, the role it plays and 
the incentives under which it operates must change. Currently, testing and 
testers are not seen as helping the product succeed but as potential 
obstacles for moving forward. They become more closely linked with 
funding and program decisions and less likely to help the weapon system 
improve. Given the pressures on program managers to keep development 
cost and schedule estimates low, being optimistic and reluctant to report 
difficulties is more important to program success than planning a realistic 
validation effort to discover design and other problems. Attempts by 
decision makers to impose cost and schedule constraints on a program 
without full consideration of what is required to reach product maturity 
levels becomes a false discipline that can intensify pressures to defer or 
weaken testing, thereby increasing the potential for late cycle churn. If 
DOD is successful in taking actions that respond to our previous 
recommendations, especially those that will reduce the pressure to oversell 
programs at their start, the Department will have taken a significant step 
toward changing what constitutes success in weapon systems and making 




To lessen the dependence on testing late in development and foster a more 
constructive relationship between program managers and testers, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the managers and testers 
of weapon system programs to work together to define levels of product 
maturity that need to be validated, structure test plans around reaching 
increasing levels of product maturity, and orchestrate the right mix of tools 
to validate these levels. Acquisition strategies should then be built and 
funded to carry out this approach. Such a focus on attaining knowledge, 
represented by product maturity levels, can guard against the pressures to 
forego valuable tests to stay on schedule or to hold tests that do not add 
value to the product. This approach, which creates common ground 
between testers and product managers in leading commercial firms 
without compromising independence, still demands that the product or 
weapon system being matured meet the needs of the customer. 
 
We also recommend that Secretary of Defense not let the validation of 
lower levels of product maturity—individual components or systems in a 
controlled setting—be deferred to the higher level of system testing in a 
realistic setting. Although the mix of testing and evaluation tools may 
change and the acquisition strategy may be altered during the course of a 
development, the focus on attaining product maturity levels should not 
change. This discipline should also help guard against the practice of 
setting cost and schedule constraints for programs without considering the 
time and money it takes to sensibly validate maturity. Finally, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense require weapon systems to 
demonstrate a specified level of product maturity before major 
programmatic approvals. In doing so, the Secretary may also need to 
establish interim indicators of product maturity to inform budget requests, 
which are made well in advance of programmatic decisions. Testing and 
evaluation could then be cast in a more constructive role of helping a 
weapon system reach these levels and would ease some of the burden 
currently placed on program managers to rely on judgment, rather than 
demonstrated product maturity, in promising success at times when major 
funding commitments have to be made. 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION AND TESTING STRATEGY 
Primary Question: What was the simulation and testing strategy for the system, 
and did that strategy adequately evaluate the system for its ultimate operational use? 
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1. Test Approach Used? 
Validation Activities: Testing and Simulation 
In the early stages of the project, the contractor did a Failure Modes Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the system.  This analysis helped establish the test 
requirements and influenced simulation.  This in turn, drove the design of test equipment 
and field automatic test equipment, and they also used the same test equipment at the 
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) facility.  Another FMECA result was that 
performance tests were run under extreme vibration conditions.  The production planning 
efforts during development focused on logistics in an effort to identify the full spectrum 
of support requirements. 
Testing and simulation (T&S) were performed in a variety of settings: T&S of 
individual components, T&S of components in controlled settings, tests of components in 
realistic settings, and a hardware-in-the-loop type systems integration simulation 
laboratory. 
The full test strategy included tests of sub-assemblies and of some individual 
components, performed by the Prime and suppliers as appropriate.  They also verified 
some components with simulations. 
The Prime, their suppliers, and Government organizations tested some integrated 
components in a controlled setting.  The Prime and U.S. Army labs performed 
simulations of some components working together in a controlled setting.  They also 
tested components working together in a realistic setting. 
A hardware-in-the-loop type systems integration simulation laboratory was used 
to check individual components of the system, and to check integrated components in a 
controlled setting.  TADS/PNVS used aircraft simulator test equipment in the aircraft 
manufacturer’s Systems Integration Laboratory. 
Summarizing the total amount spent on the testing and simulation discussed 
above, the contractor spent roughly 15% to see if the individual components of the 
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 system worked, 5% to see if integrated components worked in controlled setting, and 
80% to see if integrated components worked in a realistic setting. 
Validation work on component and system maturity was done in plenty of time to 
allow using that information to help the program.  Validation knowledge was used 
consistently to improve components and thee system.  However, the project didn’t do all 
they could early on to get rid of project risk.  The project's test philosophy was to “Break 
it big early,” but sometimes caution prevented using rigorous testing. 
Testers and project personnel on TADS/PNVS were in a good teaming 
relationship.  The TADS/PNVS program used the best validation methods available, and 
they were quick to recognize important lessons learned from this work.  The majority of 
the project validation work was of high quality. 
 
2. GAO Research: 
“Late Cycle Churn:” 
According to the GAO, within the DoD, it is fairly common to have test failures 
late in the test cycle, which could (and should) have been discovered earlier in 
development.  In industry, this is called "late-cycle churn," the scramble to fix a 
significant problem discovered late in development.  The frequent result is spending a lot 
more money to fix problems.  Discovering and fixing problems earlier in development 
costs far less money, and also saves time.  Civilian companies that develop products have 
a different testing and evaluation philosophy, the “Break it Big Early” philosophy, which 
works to preclude "late-cycle churn." 
Test Failure Consequences: 
Rather than being viewed as constructive, some DoD organizations avoid difficult 
tests because test failures can increase the probability of funding reductions or program 
cancellation.  Testing is often linked to funding and can jeopardize program support – a 
penalty environment.  However, delivering late and over budget is not viewed as harshly.  
Of course, late cycle churn has even greater cost and schedule impacts, but because of the 
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 length of the normal developmental cycle, it is frequently years later and under a new 
program manager, developer, or tester, when faults are discovered. 
Even if a program is somewhat protected by powerful ‘champions,’ other negative 
consequences are possible.  These consequences or reactions from test failures, beside 
funding reductions and program cancellation, range from getting called ‘on the carpet’ 
and reprimanded unofficially, to getting fired – and possibly career ruination.  The 
project may be protected, but that does not mean that the program manager and staff are 
similarly protected. 
However, testing is perhaps the most effective tool for discovering design 
problems.  Some development critics want you to fix everything before a particular test.  
But you have to find problems before you can fix them, and testing is a great way to find 
problems.  Discovering problems in new products is a normal part of development and 
known as ‘test-fix, test-fix, test-fix….’  Eliminating problems, which can only be done 
after discovery, improves a product.  Testing corrects latent problems that could delay 
product delivery, increase product cost, or be delivered to the customer.  Field users 
usually view faulty delivered products as a blunder. 
There is an apparently strong expectation in the military that test failures will 
cause strong negative reaction by somebody in their chain of command.  Whether this 
belief is always justified, is not as important as that it is probably true often enough to 
cause the belief to be as widespread as it is.  This expectation is a common part of 
military organizational culture, and as such, is very difficult to change. 
On the other hand, cancellation of a program due to various risks should be 
minimized.  Viewed pragmatically, if the risk due to test failures is a lot higher than due 
to schedule or cost problems, then you should not risk test failures.  This has been the 
case for quite a while. 
Less Testing: 
There are many people at different levels who have reasons to delay or diminish 
tests.  In many cases, the reason given is that the test article is not ready for the test as 
written, so modifying it is very logical. 
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 Development personnel are normally divided between developers and 
developmental testers.  This segregation helps keep the testers relatively independent, and 
therefore effective.  But there has to be someone who is in charge of them all, namely the 
program manager.  The PM is graded on how well the development goes.  If the PM 
knows the system is not ready for a test, then it is quite easy to modify some tests so that 
the system passes.  You still get some data, although it is arguable how valuable the data 
will be. 
And of course, if the PM's next promotion may depend upon the system passing a 
test, then it is hard to resist some types of changes.  Other changes include delaying tests, 
deferring difficult steps from tests, or lowering the test pass/fail criteria.  It is much more 
difficult to affect the results of major tests.  However, some programs go a long time 
between the major tests.  When the system comes to a major test and fails, it is often a 
surprise to those outside of the program. 
These test changes are often rationalized: if they know a system can not pass a 
test, they change the test to something the system can pass – what is the sense of running 
a test you know will fail?  But, then the passed test's results are occasionally substituted 
for those of the originally programmed test.  They have lowered the test criteria, while (in 
effect) presenting these results as proof that the system is on track, this does not mean 
that PMs are dishonest, but that there are routinely many testing modifications, delays, or 
de-scopings.  The end result is that testing of a system is less rigorous than needed – not 
all the delays are due to one person, or one reason – and thus the system is more prone to 
"late-cycle-churn."  Integrity requires listing test changes on test reports, to notify the 
chain of command, auditors, and other interested people. 
This fear of performing tests to learn, engendered by the expectation of negative 
reactions by higher-level managers, causes the learning curve to be lower in DoD.  
Testers 'know' they should not risk test failures because of the potential reaction of the 
Program Manager; PMs 'know' they cannot risk high-visibility test failures because of the 
Program Executive Officer's reaction; PEOs 'know' they have to consider the Service 
Acquisition Executive’s reaction; and the SAE 'knows' they must consider the SecDef 
and Congressional reactions which could result in a significant loss of funds, or even 
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 program cancellation.  Of course, this is despite an official policy to find flaws earlier.  
However, in some cases, there appears to be insufficient energy behind this newer policy 
to motivate certain echelons of the oversight chain to protect the PM’s honest 
developmental testing efforts from the circling vultures eager to pounce upon a routine 
test failure (learning experience) as an excuse to seize his funds. 
Break It Big Early – Testing to Learn: 
There are basically two types of testing: there is testing to learn, and testing to 
confirm.  The first type is done early in development, but it is frequently not used 
sufficiently by the DoD.  In commercial development, the testing philosophy is to find 
flaws and to continuously improve the product, and make it as robust as possible.  DoD 
sees testing as a "final exam" or an audit to evaluate a product.  And the culture of the 
DoD often forces managers into optimistic plans that presume success, instead of 
anticipating problems.  This success-oriented philosophy is somewhat understandable, 
given the reluctance to risk test failures. 
Break It Big Early (BIBE) is a testing-to-learn strategy.  It tells you about your 
system.  If you use this early testing as a testing-to-confirm opportunity, you are going to 
affect the attitude of the author of the test procedure, the tester, and the program manager.  
You are adjusting their attitudes, during a preliminary stage of the design.  It is all very 
well to tell the PM to reduce risk, but this ‘catch-22’ situation makes it very difficult. 
Experimental Test Pilots try to 'break' equipment, that is they tend to test an 
aircraft on the ground very rigorously, especially new systems or new features, trying to 
do whatever they can to 'break' it, and then get those failures fixed.  But when they are 
flying a prototype aircraft, they are more circumspect, and often will have a list of 
functions to avoid, and a list of corrective procedures in case something does malfunction 
or 'break.' 
Commercial companies strive for short development cycles, usually less than two 
years, which improves their return on investment.  Production is seen as a near-term 
event, so there is more impetus to test the product thoroughly and find all the hidden 
flaws. 
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 Testing for the Scorecard: 
Testing in DoD becomes a scorecard to rate system developmental progress.  A 
major test is a decision point on whether or not to proceed with the program.  Thus, 
program managers have incentives to avoid, or at least postpone, risky testing, and to 
limit open communications of results.  Oversight organizations occasionally try to get 
access to lower level test data, although some program managers may be able to fend 
them off.  Program success is frequently determined (especially by proponents in 
Congress with constituent jobs at risk) by how well you keep the money coming in, not if 
the product fulfills its requirements.  'Full funding' is not an end in itself; the system must 
fulfill its requirements, as verified by testing. 
In both DoD and commercial companies, testing is conducted by separate 
organizations.  The separation makes testers independent, and hopefully more candid.  
However, the negative side of the separation, is testers have less say in the design; 
testability is not designed in.  Testers look at requirements from the point of view of how 
they will be tested, which is a useful perspective and a design tool that DoD often 
overlooks.  Also, in the DoD there is often an adversarial relationship between developers 
and testers, particularly the Operational Testers. 
GAO recommends increasing levels of maturity earlier in the development cycle, 
and proposes various methods to carry this out.  However, the negative incentives 
surrounding rigorous early tests still remain in DoD.  If acquisition managers are going 
pursue a higher level of maturity, they will have to decrease the risk of test failures 
resulting in funding losses.  This will not be easy to do.  The GAO study quotes a 
September 1999 report from the Defense Science Board: “The response to perceived test 
failures is often inappropriate and counterproductive.”  The GAO continues:  
Instead of using testing, especially in the early stages, as a vital learning 
mechanism and an opportunity to expand product knowledge, testing is 
often used as a basis for withholding funding, costly rescheduling, or 




 D. CONCLUSIONS ON SIMULATION AND TESTING STRATEGY 
Primary Question: What was the simulation and testing strategy for the system, 
and did that strategy adequately evaluate the system for its intended ultimate operational 
use? 
 
1. Test Approach Used? 
Validation Activities: Testing and Simulation 
The contractor performed a Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), and it strongly impacted design, testing, test equipment, and simulation.  The 
testing and simulation (T&S) had considerable variety.  Various organizations did tests of 
components, sub-assemblies, and the end system; some components were verified by 
simulations.  They tested components and sub-assemblies in controlled settings 
(hardware-in-the-loop), and sub-assemblies in a realistic setting (aircraft simulator test 
equipment).  The vast majority of the test money was spent on the last category, with a 
modest amount on testing in controlled settings. 
Fairly high quality validation work helped the program in system maturity and 
improving components, but some early risks were not handled as well as they should 
have been.  This is possibly an instance of avoiding testing that might fail and 
consequently threaten the program's continued funding.  However, testers and project 
personnel usually worked well together. 
 
2. GAO Research: 
The Best Practices GAO Report shows that DoD programs routinely suffer from 
“Late Cycle Churn,” a condition describing operational testing failures that discovered 
problems that should have been revealed in earlier developmental testing.  Commercial 
developers use the “Break it Big Early” philosophy.  It allows them to uncover system 
problems earlier, when they are less expensive to fix. 
But DoD is reluctant to run a test that they might fail, even if it might highlight 
potential flaws.  Test failure could cause the program to loose some of its funding or be 
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 cancelled – a harsh penalty.  It also reflects poorly on the Program Managers, to the 
extent that they may never be promoted again.  Late deliveries and cost overruns are 
more common and not so harshly punished.  If DoD hopes to modify this balance, they 
need to also modify the probabilities (and severity) of rewards and punishments. 
DoD does less testing early in development, which impacts the readiness of the 
system in late-cycle operational testing.  The program manager, developers, and testers 
should not be judged solely on developmental success, but also on running a thorough 
developmental test program.  Otherwise, there is a great incentive to run cursory tests. 
Testing is a value-added activity, a necessity for successful development.  The 
more rigorous the testing, the more you find out about the test article.  You have to find 
flaws in order to fix them.  But testing-to-learn should not be used for a 'final exam' or 
'Scorecard' opportunity. 
Simply ordering program managers to test more thoroughly will probably not be 
effective for DoD in the long run.  Any programs that increase testing will undoubtedly 
uncover more problems; however, if those programs face the threat of being cancelled, 
then future program managers will get the message that more thorough testing will not 
save their programs.  DoD must change the definition of what constitutes success in 
weapon systems and increase constructive testing and evaluation. 
The testing philosophy of the TADS/PNVS program was not very different than 
those of other defense contractor companies at the time.  The TADS/PNVS was a very 
important part of the AAH program, but very risky.  It is likely that upper DoD managers 
would have balked at the contract if it had presented a realistic cost estimate (based upon 
“20-20 hindsight.”)  But the lower cost caused some risky behavior – you cannot allocate 







 E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Test Strategies: 
Study how the merging of Developmental Testing with Operational Testing has 
affected the openness of the program management offices and development contractors to 
the “break it big early” philosophy. 
 
2. NASA Development Test Strategies: 
Study how the NASA compares with the DoD and commercial developers in their 
testing strategy.  Do these developers compare more to the commercial model, or the 
military model.  What are the effects of large Government bureaucracy on test strategies?  
Also, what are the political factors affecting testing strategy?  Does NASA have more 
control of its funding, or is it just as subject to cancellation if a system has poor test 
results? 
 
3. Independent Research and Development (IR&D): 
Some programs have taken the route of off-loading more and more of their high-
risk work to separate IR&D projects.  This reduces overall program risk, and test 'failures' 
can be disassociated from the program.  These strategies may help programs lower their 
risk of losing funding, while reducing developmental risk.  Study how programs do this, 
what percentage of work is off-loaded, and their various strategies for integrating results 
back into the system. 
 
4. Commercial Versus DoD Developmental Programs: 
Study commercial and DoD developmental programs and compare them on the 
basis of program size, program development time period and program complexity.  This 
will supplement the overall comparison of all programs.  Are the DoD programs of 
similar size / complexity / development time as efficient as commercial programs?  
Compare how well each has adopted lean engineering and lean manufacturing 
techniques. 
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 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AAH  AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
AMC  U.S. Army Material Command 
AMCOM U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
ASH  Advanced Scout Helicopter – cancelled in the 1970s 
ATCOM U.S. Army Aviation and Troup Command (ATCOM and MICOM 
  are now merged into AMCOM) 
D  Development (Question on the Survey) 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DOS  Disk Operating System 
DPM  Deputy Program Manager 
DSMC  Defense System Management College 
FLIR  Forward-Looking Infra-Red 
FTA  FLIR Target Acquisition 
G&C  Guidance and Controls Laboratory 
GAO  General Accounting Office 
IPT  Integrated Product Team 
IBM  International Business Machines 
IR&D  Independent Research and Development 
LOS  Line-of-Sight 
LOSS  Line-of-Sight Stabilization 
LSBS  Laser to sensor bore-sight  
MICOM U.S. Army Missile Command(ATCOM and MICOM are now 
  merged into AMCOM) 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
NVL  Night Vision Laboratory 
OS  Operating System 
ODS  Operation Desert Storm 
PM  Program Manager 
PMO  Program Manager’s Office 
PNVS  Pilot Night Vision System 
S&T Science and Technology Group within system Prime Contractor
 responsible for doing IR&D and developing new technology 
 and concepts. 
SP  Start of Program (Question on the Survey) 
TADS  Target Acquisition Designation System 
Technology A Line-of-Sight Stabilization 
Technology B FLIR target acquisition 
Technology C Laser to sensor bore-sight 
TP  Transition to Production (Question on the Survey) 
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 TRADOC U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command (and/or other 
appropriate user representatives) 
TRL  Technology Readiness Level 
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 APPENDIX A: COMBINED QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE: 
The combined survey was created by combining the answers from Government 
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